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RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The relevant statutory provisions are set forth in the initial Appellant's Brief and Appellee 
Brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The issues in this case are: (1) whether this Court should overrule or modify its decision 
in Peterson v. Browning. 832 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1992); (2) whether the Utah Education 
Evaluation Act, Section 53A-10-101 et seq., Utah Code Annotated 1953, (herein "EEA") creates 
a private right of action by educators where a school district fails to comply with the requirements 
of the EEA; (3) whether Plaintifl7Appellant (herein "Plaintiff") is entitled to reinstatement even if 
her claim for damages is barred by governmental immunity; and (4) if the EEA creates a private 
right of action, is the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, §§ 63-30 1 et seq., Utah Code 
Annotated 1953 , a defense as suggested by Defendant/Appellee (herein "Defendant"). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO REINSTATEMENT EVEN IF 
THE COURT DOES NOT MODIFY OR OVERRULE 
PETERSON V, BROWNING 
Defendant argues that the public policy exception to the employment at-will doctrine 
sounds in tort and therefore Plaintiffs claims are barred by the Governmental Immunity Act, 
Section 63-30-1 et seq., Utah Code Annotated 1953. The arguments for overruling or 
modifying Browning are set forth in Plaintiffs Brief. However, whether or not this Court 
overrules or modifies Browning, Plaintiff submits that her Complaint seeks damages and 
reinstatement for wrongful discharge. Plaintiffs Complaint, p. 5. ( R. 6) 
It is well established that the Governmental Immunity Act is not a defense to equitable 
claims. See, e.g., Bowles v. State ex rel. Department of Transportation, 652 P.2d 1345 (Utah 
1982). 
Reinstatement is an equitable remedy. Thurston v. Box Elder County. 260 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 22, 1995 WL 130055 (Mar. 24, 1995), P.2d (Utah 1995). Accordingly, 
governmental immunity is no defense to Plaintiffs requested reinstatement, although it may bar 
monetary damages. Thus, Plaintiff is entitled to have her case for wrongful discharge heard on 
the issue of reinstatement. 
POINT n 
PLAINTIFF CANNOT BE DISCHARGED FOR REASONS 
CONTRARY TO LAW WHETHER OR NOT SHE IS A 
PROVISIONAL EMPLOYEE 
A. The Utah Educator Evaluation Act is a Limitation on the Authority of 
School Boards to Terminate Educators1 Employment Contracts and Creates a 
Private Right of Action to Enforce those Rights. 
In our Brief of Appellant ("Initial Brier), we demonstrated that the EEA creates a 
private right of action. Specifically, we explained that this Court in Griflfin v MemmottT 814 P.2d 
601 (Utah App. 1991), established a test to determine whether a statutory scheme creates a 
private right of action. The application of the Griflfin test to the comprehensive statutory scheme 
for identifying, notifying and remediating provisional educators indicates a legislative intent to 
create in a provisional educator a private right of action to enforce the requirements of the statute. 
In response, Defendant suggests that provisional educators may be discharged for "any 
reason, or for no reason at all." Appellee's Brief, p. 7. There are, of course, many reasons 
provisional employees may not be lawfully discharged. Among those reasons are the public policy 
exceptions listed in Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1992) at 1281-82. Educators 
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may not be terminated for exercising First Amendment rights. See Pickering v. Board of 
Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (holding that an educator may not be terminated for criticizing 
the way in which his superintendent and school board raised and spent money); McLaughlin v. 
Iflgndis, 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968) (holding that two probationary teachers could not be 
dismissed because they joined a union and that they had a right of free association); Bums v. 
Willis Independent School District 713 F.2d 1087 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that although a school 
board may refuse to renew a teacher's contract for any legitimate reason, it may not do so in 
retaliation for the teacher's support for and association with former school board members). Nor 
may educators, provisional or otherwise, be terminated because they are women, black, pregnant, 
over age 40, or handicapped. See Section 34-35-6, Utah Code Annotated 1953. There are 
many restraints on the authority of local boards of education to terminate employees. The 
limitations are found in federal and state constitutions, in federal and state laws, and injudicial 
decisions. The EEA is an additional limitation on the authority of local boards of education to 
terminate provisional educators "for any reason, or for no reason at all.M 
To avoid Plaintiffs argument that the EEA provides specific benefits to provisional 
educators, Defendant argues that the primary purpose of the EEA is to "protect school authorities 
from claims of negligence in hiring or retaining incompetent or otherwise unsuitable teachers." 
Defendant's Brief, p. 15. Defendant makes its primary purpose argument because Cort v. Ask 
422 U.S. 66,45 L. Ed 26, 95 S. Ct. 2080 (1975), at 422 U.S. 84 holds that no private right of 
action is created absent an express statement of legislative intent where it is only a secondary 
purpose to protect a specified class of persons. 
Nothing in the EEA or the record supports Defendant's effort to argue that the primary 
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purpose of the EEA is the protection of school districts from negligent hiring and Defendant 
provides no reference to case law or statute in support of its assertion. Indeed, it is difficult to 
read into the EEA anything to do with negligent hiring of employees as evaluations and 
remediation take place after hiring occurs. Plaintiff does, however, agree that the EEA impacts 
the retention of both provisional and continuing contract educators. 
Defendant also states that Plaintiff is not entitled to EEA protection because 
"[conspicuously absent is language requiring the District to attempt to remediate a provisional 
teacher who is considered insubordinate."1 Defendant's Brief, p. 15. However, the EEA contains 
several provisions which apply specifically to provisional educators and require remedial efforts 
for those provisional educators whose performance is identified as inadequate. As we 
demonstrated in our Initial Brief, these specific provisions indicate a legislative intent to create a 
private right of action. Plaintiff submits that if the primary purpose of the EEA was to improve 
school district's evaluation programs or protect from claims of negligent retention, the EEA 
would not have in its provisions such detailed rights and projections for provisional educators. 
See Brief of Appellant, pp. 12-13. 
Defendant may have attempted to insert the insubordination argument into this case for 
the reason that courts have held that insubordination is not remediable. Board of Education of 
Chicago v. Harris. 578 N.E. 2d 1244 (111. App. Ct. 1991). Plaintiff showed in her Initial Brief 
that the actions of Plaintiff in advocating for a special education student are acts protected by 
federal law. Further, during the investigation bv the Office of Civil Rights Compliance, Defendant 
It is noteworthy that the Defendant asserts as evidence of Plaintiffs irremediable insubordination conduct 
which Plaintiff was required by federal law to perform. See Plaintiffs Brief, p. 26. In any event, Plaintiff is entitled to 
present evidence at trial as to whether or not her conduct is irremediable. 
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specifically denied that the Defendant terminated Plaintiffs employment because she had 
advocated for the placement of J. B. in a special education program. See Plaintiffs Complaint 
p. 3, % 13; and letter from the Office of Civil Rights dated April 9, 1993 attached in Addendum C. 
The weakness of Defendant's arguments are found in the cases and authorities cited by it 
for the proposition that the EEA provides no protection to provisional educators. Defendant 
argues that Hopp v. Oroville School District No 410. 639 P.2d 872 (Wash. App. 2d 1982), 
attached in Addendum A, holds that probationary teachers acquire no rights under the 
Washington Educator Evaluation law. (The Washington law is not included with Defendant's 
Brief). In holding that the Washington Evaluation Law did not apply to provisional educators, 
the court cited a section of Washington law relating to the termination of provisional teachers: 
This section provides the exclusive means for nonrenewing the 
employment contract of a provisional employee and no other 
provision of law shall be applicable thereto. 
(Emphasis original.) Id. at 875. The court held that because the foregoing statute was 
enacted after the evaluation law, the legislature had expressly precluded the provisions of the 
evaluation law from applying to the termination of provisional teachers. 
Unlike the Washington law, Utah has no preemptive language. Additionally, the EEA 
clearly defines the rights of provisional educators while the Washington scheme addressed "all 
employees." The Washington court concluded that the failure of the legislature to specifically 
mention probationary teachers in the evaluation law was "good reason to believe the probationary 
requirements of (the evaluation law) do not apply to provisional teachers." Id. at 875-76. 
The EEA, in contrast to the Washington law, clearly identifies the rights of provisional 
educators. Thus, Hopp does not support Defendant's position, but instead suggests the 
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conclusion that where the statute specifically mentions provisional employees, it provides 
protection to that class of individuals. 
In Roberts v. Lincoln County School District Number One, 676 P.2d 577 (Wyo. 1984), 
cited by Defendant, the plaintiff, a provisional teacher, claimed that the board's failure to follow its 
own evaluation procedures was arbitrary and capricious. The evaluation policy of the Lincoln 
County School board read: 
Formal evaluations for nontenure teachers shall be made at least four times 
each year on forms to be provided. The first two evaluations shall be completed 
before December, and the second two before March of each school year. 
The minimum basic procedures leading to formal evaluations of teachers 
shall include the following: 
1. The principal or his designated representative (assistant principal, district administrator, 
and/or supervisor) shall visit each teacher in the classroom several times during each 
school year and shall record the general nature of visitations on a form to be provided, 
with a copy for the teacher and the principal. All observations shall be conducted openly 
and with the full knowledge of the teacher. A teacher or the principal or his designated 
representative may request a conference to discuss the visit. 
2. At least once each year in the case of tenure teachers, and at least twice each 
year in the case of nontenure teachers, the principal or his designated 
representative shall schedule a formal evaluative interview with each teacher prior 
to the evaluation deadlines established. 
Nowhere in the Lincoln policy are provisional teacher rights identified. The language is 
minimal and focuses its direction to the principal or his designated representative to conduct 
evaluations. 
Not surprisingly, the Roberts court held, ,f[i]n this case, the regulations establishing 
evaluative policies were not designed for the protection of nontenured teachers such as appellant, 
but were primarily for the benefit of the school district in performing its operational and 
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supervisory duties." Id. at 581.2 
The Wyoming court also held that as Ms. Roberts was dismissed for reasons unrelated to 
her teaching responsibilities, and the district's evaluation procedures adopted by the board related 
to classroom duties, the evaluation did not relate to the decision to terminate Plaintiff as that 
decision was based on her coaching duties. Id. at 581. Roberts is attached in Addendum A. 
Leonard v. Converse County School District No 2 788 P.2d 1119 (Wyo. 1990), is a 
restatement of RoheEtS> supra, with a twist. The complaint in Leonard alleged that both the 
policies of the school district section of Wyoming state law "required that initial contract teachers 
be evaluated in writing twice a year and receive copies of their evaluations." Id. at 1119. The 
language of the statute under which Leonard was decided is much more succinct than the contract 
language in RohfillS. 
The court dismissed Ms. Leonard's complaint citing Roberts, supra, and finding that both 
the statute and the district's evaluation policy were for the "benefit of the school district in 
performing its operational and supervisory duties." Ibid. Leonard is attached in Addendum A. 
Neither Roberts nor Leonard support Defendant's claim that the EEA does not apply to 
provisional educators for the reason that the Lincoln and Converse County school district policies 
lack any reference to the rights of provisional educators. The language of the statute and the 
policies are what the Wyoming court construed them to mean: internal directions to 
Because Roberts involved the board of education's interpretation of its own policies, the court adopted the 
standard of review that it would only "interfere with school board actions if they are arbitrary and capricious or 
fraudulent; however, we will not otherwise substitute our judgment. Absent abuse, we will not interfere with the 
exercise of discretionary acts authorized by statute." Roberts. 676 P.2d 557,580. This is not the standard of review 
this Court must apply. Where the Court is asked to construe the meaning of a state law, it reviews questions of general 
law "under a correction of error standard, giving no deference to the agency's decision." Ouestar Pipeline Co. V. State 
Tax Commission. 817 P.2d 316.318 (Utah 199R 
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administrators. Unlike the Lincoln and Converse County policies and the Wyoming teacher 
evaluation law, the EEA specifically sets forth the rights of provisional educators and, among 
other things, require that Plaintiff be advised regarding her alleged deficiencies and be given an 
opportunity to remediate. Roberts, SUpia. 
Defendants citation to Schofield v. Richland County School District. 447 S.E. 2d 189 
(S.C. 1994), is also misplaced. Schofield was decided after a bench trial. The trial judge found 
that the teacher's deficiencies were not areas included in the evaluation program. The trial judge 
concluded that, "the School District may refuse to renew the contract of a provisional teacher on 
the basis of performance concerns that arise independent of the statutory evaluation and 
remediation procedures." Id. at 190. The court held at 447 S. E. 2d 191: 
The plain language of section 59-26-40 requires the School district to provide remedial 
assistance only in those areas in which deficiencies are noted during the three required 
classroom evaluations. Here, Teacher's contract was not renewed based on performance 
concerns that arose independently of the evaluation process. 
(Emphasis original.) 
The Schofield court also noted that the evaluation law specifically stated, "[i]f the 
evaluation indicates that the provisional teacher has performed in an adequate manner, the teacher 
is eligible for an annual contract." Id. at 191. The court emphasized that the statute used the 
phrase "eligible" for an annual contract, not that the teacher was entitled to an annual contract. 
Plaintiff submits that the law of Schofield entitles her to have the issue of whether the 
Defendant's evaluation program would have addressed the "real reasons" for which her 
employment with Defendant was not renewed and whether those deficiencies are remediable. 
Defendant's citation to CRourke, M., Nonrenewal of Teacher Contracts: A Primer on 
South Dakota Statutory and Case Law, 39 So. Dak. L. Rev. 237 (1994), is most helpful. Two 
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pages address teacher evaluation. Those pages are attached in Addendum B. The section on 
teacher evaluation reads in part: 
In Schauh, a nontenured, nonrenewed teacher sought reinstatement to her position 
based on allegations that the school board did not follow its own rules in regard to teacher 
evaluations. The court stated that it was unclear whether the board had violated any of its 
own evaluation policies, but that it was clear from the record that Schaub knew "that the 
Board was concerned with certain deficiencies in her teaching." In any event, the court 
reiterated a test with regard to reinstatement under these circumstances: 
[A] violation by the Board of a rule does not in and of itself justify 
reinstatement of the teacher. The test in determining whether reinstatement 
is the proper remedy for a violation of teacher evaluation statutes is 
"whether a grievant has shown that the violation substantially and directly 
impaired his or her ability to improve himself or herself and attain 
continuing contract status." 
The court held that since Schaub had prior knowledge of her deficiencies, and had ample 
opportunity to correct them before her termination notice, any violation by the school 
board of teacher evaluation policies did not "substantially or directly impair" the teacher's 
ability to improve herself. 
Id. at p. 262. 
The CRourke article clearly supports Plaintiffs argument that the Defendant's failure to 
truthfully advise her of deficiencies in her performance "substantially and directly" impaired her 
ability to improve herself and entitles Plaintiff to have the fact issue of whether the District's 
complaints about Plaintiff were remediable. 
B. Plaintiffs Claim for Violations of the Education Evaluation Act 
are not Barred bv the Governmental Immunity Act . 
Defendant states that an action brought to remedy a violation of the EEA sounds in tort 
and is therefore immunized. Plaintiff has previously argued that this cause of action is more in the 
nature of a contract violation and is therefore not subject to the requirements of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. See Appellant's Brief, pp. 23-24. It is elementary hornbook law 
9 
that: 
The necessity of a special duty owed the plaintiff by the governmental body whose acts or 
omissions are alleged to have caused him injury or damage may be deemed satisfied where 
the conduct of the public entity violated a statute or ordinance enacted for the benefit of 
the class of persons to which the plaintiff belonged. Thus, a statute imposing a mandatory 
duty on a municipality through its officers or employees, and requiring action not only for 
the protection of the general public but more particularly for the benefit of those persons 
or class of persons within the ambit of the danger involved, provided a basis for municipal 
liability where immunity had been abrogated by statute for those functions not involving 
executive or administrative discretion. One court observed that whether the public duty 
doctrine would exculpate the government from liability was irrelevant where the facts 
showed a special duty owed under law to a class of persons to which the injured party 
belonged. 
57 Am Jur 2d, Municipal, School and State Tort Liability, § 143. 
Defendant's argument that the Governmental Immunity Act is a defense in this case is an 
attempt to apply Peterson in the area of statutory duty. If the EEA does not create a private right 
of action, then Defendant's argument that Plaintiffs cause of action sounds in tort may be correct. 
But if as we have shown the EEA does in fact create a private right of action, the Governmental 
Immunity Act does not apply under either the breach of contract theory or the theory that 
governmental immunity is waived where a statute is enacted "for the benefit of the class of 
persons to which plaintiff belonged.M Id. at 57 Am Jur 2d § 143. 
Accordingly, Defendant's contention that Governmental Immunity bars suits brought by 
provisional educators under the EEA is without merit. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in granting Defendant summary judgment. The EEA creates a private 
right of action. This case should be remanded to determine whether the Defendant substantially 
complied with the requests of the EEA, whether the Defendant's failure to comply with the 
requests of the EEA substantially and directly impaired Plaintiffs ability to improve herself and 
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whether any of the reasons for her nonrenewal were not remediable. Additionally, Plaintiff is 
entitled to have her case heard by the trial court on the issue of reinstatement. 
DATED this 12th day of May, 1995. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ichael' 
East 5180 South 
Murray, Utah 84107 
(801) 266-4461 
Attorney for Plaintifl7Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the foregoing REPLY 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT were mailed this 12th day of May, 1995, postage 
prepaid, to: 
Elizabeth King 
Assistant Attorney General 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
fiael T. McCoy 
torney for Plaintiff Appellant 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
872 Wash. 639 PACIFIC REPORTER,. 2d SERIES. 
RCW Title ^was repealed by implication. 
Yet the unambiguous language of RCW 
9A-04.010(3) states that Cook could be pros-
ecuted under the former criminal provisions 
as if the new criminal code had not been 
enacted. Although not part of a repealing 
act, the provision expresses the intent of 
the legislature and cannot be ignored. 
The judgment and sentence is affirmed. 
CORBETT and SWANSON, J.f concur. 
ISYSIBT> 
31 Wash.App. 184 
Erik I , HOPP, Appellant, 
v. 
• .'.'STRICT NO. 
**',, . . impendent. 
No. 4194-III-8. 
Court of Appeals of Washington, 
Division 3, Panel Four-
Jan. 21, 1982. 
Rehearing Denied March 12, 1982 
Provisional high school teacher appeal-
ed from a decision of the Superior Court, 
Okanogan County, B. E. Kohls, J., which 
denied his writ of certiorari to review a 
decision of the school district which refused 
to renew his contract The Court of Ap-
peals, Mclnturff, C. J., held that: (1) provi-
sional employees statute, which applied 
alike to all first-year teaching or noncertifi-
cated employees in school district, had a 
rational basis and was therefore not uncon-
stitutional, and (2) probationary provisions 
of statute establishing evaluative criteria 
and procedure for certificated employees 
did not apply to provisional 'teacher. 
Affirmed. 
I C .tit , ;< i >nal Law <•=» 277(2) 
There is no constitutional "property" 
interest in public employment. 
2. Constitutional Law *»277(1) 
Property interests are defined !::•,] i ules 
which stem from state law. 
3. Schools to 133.7 
Provisional teacher did not have a fun-
damental property right to employment 
which requires that provisional employees 
statute be measured by strict scrutiny test; 
rather, applicable review standard was 
three-pronged rational basis test West's 
RCWA 28A.67.072. 
4. Constitutional Law to 278.5(3) 
Schools «=» 133.7 
Provisional employees statute:.,, which • 
applied alike to all first-year teaching or 
iion,certificated employees in school district, 
had a rational basis and was therefore not 
unconstitutional West's RCWA 28A.67.-
rS\ Schools to 133.11 
Probationary provisions of statute: es-
rung evaluative criteria and procedure 
<rtificated employees did not apply to 
<ional teacher. West's RCWA 28A.67.-
„•«. J3A.67.Q72. 
6. Statutes to 1.81.(1), 184 
In interpreting a statute it is duty of 
court to ascertain and give effect to intent 
and purpose of legislature. 
7. Statutes to223.2(l) 
Statutes in pari materia must be con-
strued together in ascertaining legislative 
intent in order to give each statute meaning 
and "validity 
8. Statutes to212.1 
Legislature is presumed to' 'be familiar 
with its prior enactments when creating a 
new statute. 
S. Statutes to 181(2) 
No construction should be given to a 
statute which leads to absurdity. 
10. Schools to 133,15 
School district was not contractually 
bound to apply the dictates of statute estab-
lishing evaluative criteria and procedure for 
certificated employees prior to nonrenewal 
HOPP v OROV1LLE SCHOOL DIST NO 410 * a a h 8 7 1 
C1W «*, WastuApp^ est P-2d 872 
of contract )f provisional teacher West's ment period, an evaluar »n retort on Mr 
RCWA 28A67 065 28A 67 072 Hopp was made by he pnn ipal if Oroville 
111 Schools * » 141(5) H l * h S c h o o i T h € D i a t r i c t 3 e v a l u a t l o n P ° h -
cy includes evaluation criteria required by 
- Provisional high school teacher whose
 R C W 28A 67 065 ^ including instructional 
contract was not renewed, who made no
 s k l l , d a 3 s r o o m m a n a ^ m e n t professional 
showing that school board exceeded its jur-
 p r e p a r a t l o n a n d scholarship, effort toward 
isdiction or that the proceedings were erro-
 i m p r o v e m e n t when needed, handling . tu-
neous, void, or contrary to common law,
 d e n t d l 8 C i p h n e f i n t e r e s t m t e B c h m g k n o w U 
was not entitled to a writ of certiorari
 e d g e o f a u b j e c t m a t t e r a n d ^nonAi q u a h . 
authorizing review of school board's action
 t l e a T h e e v a luat ion noted vanous areas of 
West a RCWA 7 16 040 deficiency and suggested means of improve-
m e n t ' 
Kelly Hancock, R J Sloan J r , Omak, for 
appellant 
William E Garnett, OroviUe, for respoi 
dent 
McINTURFF, Chief Judge 
Enk Hopp appeals the denial i 1i I 
of certiorari to review a decisin . of the 
Oroville School District No 410 (District) 
That decision precluded renewal of his con-
t ract after his initial year of teaching in the 
Distr ict 
Mr Hopp was hired by the District to 
teach at Oroville High School during the 
1979-80 school year. On November 27, 
1979, withm the first 90 days of the employ-
1. RCW 28A.67 065 states in part 
'(1) The superintendent of public instruction 
shall, on or before January 1,. 1977, establish 
and may amend from time to time minimum 
criteria for the evaluation of the professional 
performance capabilities and development of 
certificated classroom teachers and certificated 
support personnel For claasroom teachers the 
criteria shall be developed in the following cat-
egories Instructional skill; classroom manage-
ment, professional preparation and scholarship, 
effort toward improvement when needed; the 
handling of student discipline and attendant 
problems, and interest in teaching pupils and 
knowledge of subject matter Such criteria 
shall be subject to review by November 1, 
1976, by four members of the legislature, one 
from each caucus of each house, including the 
chairpersons of the respective education com-
mittees 
"It shall be the responsibility of a principal or 
Ills or her designee to evaluate all certificated 
personnel in his or her school During each 
school year ail classroom teachers and certifi-
cated support personnel, hereinafter referred to 
as "employees in this section shall be 11 
On March 10 Mr Hopp was gnen an 
annual evaluation report bj Principal Mot-
ta This report again noted deficiencies in 
tanoua areas and a lack of improvement 
irom the prior evaluation On May 13, 
1980, the superintendent of the school dis-
trict advised Mr Hopp in writing of his 
decision not to renew the teaching contract 
for the 1980-81 school year, listing reasons 
for the determination and advising him of 
procedures for requesting reconsideration 
of the decision On May 16, 1980, Mr. 
Hopp 3 attorney advised the superintendent 
by letter of a request for an informal meet-
ing to present evidence for reconsideration. 
The meeting was held on May 28, 1980; 
present were Mr. Hopp and his attorney, 
served for the purposes of evaluation at least 
twice In the performance of their assigned 
duties 
'Every employee whose work is judged un-
satisfactory based on district evaluation crite-
ria shall be noufied in writing of stated specific 
areas of deficiencies along with a suggested 
specific and reasonable program for improve-
ment on or before February 1st of each year 
A probationary period shall be established be-
ginning on or before February 1st and ending 
no later than May 1st The purpose of the 
probationary period is to give the employee 
opportunity to demonstrate improvements in 
his or her areas of deficiency Lack of 
necessary improvement shall be specifically 
documented m writing with notification to the 
probationer and shall constitute grounds for a 
finding of probable cause under RCW 28A.58.-
450 or 28A 67 070, as now or hereafter amend-
ed 
2. The record does not contain a copy jf Mr 
Hopp s evaluations. Since no error was as-
signed to the court's findings relative to the 
evaluations wr idopt them as verities 
939 P 24—M 
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the District superintendent,, Mr. Motta, and 
counsel for the District. Mr. Hopp present-
ed letters from several feilow teachers and 
other supporters in addition to a memoran-
dum of legal authority. On June 3, 1980, 
the superintendent recommended nonre-
newal of the contract to the Oroville School 
Board. 
'V ii. • :he board of directors 
^w.... ,.- -.- :he matter. Mr. Hopp 
wn.i airx and represented by two 
ait*>rne\^ - . . ./mi tied additional argu-
ments on M<- Hopp's benalf. At a special 
meeting on June 17, 1980, the Board voted 
not to renew Mr. Hopp's teaching contract 
and notified him of their decision. 
Mr. Hopp subsequently filed a petition 
for writ of certiorari asking the Okanogan 
3 ~ "V 28A.67.072 states 
withstanding the provisions of RCW 
-170 is now or hereafter amended, every 
* )yed by a school district in a teach-
nonsupervisory certificated posi-
subject to nonrenewal of employ-
provided in this section dur-
of employment by such dis-
•> iefined in this section 
ed to as 'provisional 
tendent of the 
- the employment 
contract or any provisional employee should 
not be renewed by the district for the next 
ensuing term such provisional employee shall 
be notified thereof in writing on or before May 
15th preceding the commencement of such 
school term, which notification shall state the 
reason or reasons for such determination. 
Such notice shall be served upon the provision-
al employee personally, or by certified or regis-
tered mail, or by leaving a copy of the notice at 
the place of his or her usual abode with some 
person of suitable age and discretion then resi-
dent therein. The determination of the super-
intendent shall be subject to the evaluation 
requirements of RCW 28A.67.065, as now or 
hereafter amended. 
"Every such provisional employee so noti-
fied, at bis or her request made in writing and 
filed with the superintendent of the district 
within ten days after receiving such notice, 
shall be given the opportunity to meet infor-
mally with the superintendent for the purpose 
of requesting the superintendent to reconsider 
his or her decision. Such meeting shall be held 
no later than ten days following the receipt of 
such request, and the provisional employee 
shall be given written notice of the date, time 
and place of meeting at least three days prior 
thereto. At such meeting the provisional em-
Superior Court to review the school dis-
trict's proceedings. The court filed findings 
of fact and conclusions of law denying the 
petition and dismissed the action with prej-
udice, 
On appeal,, Mr. Hopo claims RCW 
28A.67.072,1 the provisional employee stat-
ute, is violative of his due process and equal 
protection rights. We disagree. 
[1-3] Initially, we note our courts have 
held there is no constitutional "property'* 
interest in public employment. Giles v. De-
partment of Soc. <& Health Servs, 90 
Wash.2d 457, 461, 583 P.2d 1213 (1978). 
Property interests are defined by rules 
which stem from state law. Bishop v. 
Wood. 426 U.S. 341, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 48 
L.Ed.2d 684 (1976); State ex re/. Swartoat 
ployee shall be given the opportunity to refute 
any facts upon which the superintendent's de-
termination was based and to make any argu-
ment in support of his or her request for recon-
sideration. 
"Within ten days following the meeting with 
the provisional employee, the superintendent 
shall either reinstate the provisional employee 
or shall submit to the school district board of 
directors for consideration at its next regular 
meeting a written report recommending that 
the employment contract of the provisional em-
ployee be nonrenewed and stating the reason 
or reasons therefor. A copy of such report 
shall be delivered to the provisional employee 
at least three days prior to the scheduled meet-
ing of the board of directors. In taking action 
upon the recommendation of the superintend-
ent, the board of directors shall consider any 
written communication which the provisional 
employee may file with the secretary of the 
board at any time prior to that meeting. 
'The board of directors shall notify the provi-
sional employee in writing of its final decision 
within ten days following the meeting at which 
the superintendent's recommendation was con-
sidered. The decision of the board of directors 
* to nonrenew the contract of a provisional em-
ployee shall be final and not subject to appeal 
"This section applies to any person employed 
by a school district in a teaching or other non-
supervisory certificated position after June 25, 
1976. This section provides the exclusive 
means for nonrenewing the employment con-
tract of a provisional employee and no other 
provision of law shall be applicable thereto, 
including, without limitation, RCW 28A.67.070, 
and chapter 28A.3S RCW, as now or hereafter 
amended."* 
HOPP v. OROVILLE SCHOOL DIST. NO. 
C1U as, WasilApfK. 439 PJ2d 872 
410 Wash. 875 
f ™'i/ Service Comm'n, 25 Wash.App. 174, 
*)5 P.2d 796 (1980). Thus, Mr. Hopp, 
provisional teacher under RCW 
. 072, does not have a fundamental 
property right to employment which re-
quires us to measure the questioned statute 
by the strict scrutiny test.4 Consequently, 
the applicable review standard is the three-
pronged rational basis test of Equitable 
Shipyards, Inc. v. State, 93 Washed 465, 
478, 611 P.2d 396 (1980): 
(1) Does the classification apply alike to 
all members within the designated class? 
(2) Does some basis in reality exist for 
reasonably distinguishing between those 
within and without the designated class? 
(3) Does the classification have a rational 
relation to the purpose of the challenged 
statute? 
r
- ' First, we find RCW 28A 67.072 ap-
iike to all first-year teaching or non-
1
 employees in the District 
probationary period under this 
statute is a legitimate precondition to be-
stowing benefits of public employment 
Ross v. Department ofSoc. & Health Servs.f 
23 Wash App. 265, 271,594 P.2d 1386 (1979). 
Last, a rational basis exists because of the 
need for a probationary period in which an 
employer may observe the performance of 
the probationary employee prior to confer-
ral of a continuing contract under RCW 
28A.67.070 with its elaborate procedural 
system. The rational purpose behind RCW 
28A.67.072 was to afford a means of assur-
ing effective teachers and proper education. 
See generally State ex rel. Swartout v. Civil 
Serv. Comm'n, supra, 25 WasltApp. at 179-
80, 605 P.2d 796. The statute passes consti-
tutional muster. 
[5] Next, Mr. Hopp argues the Board 
acted illegally by failing to apply the proba-
tionary provisions under RCW 28A.67.065.' 
He maintains these probationary provisions 
are preconditions to nonrenewal of teaching 
contracts, whether the teacher is provisional 
or otherwise. 
4. If 'the statute or rale creates an inherently 
suspect classification such as is baaed upon 
race, nationality or alienage, when challenged, 
it will be subject to strict judicial scrutiny. The 
enactment would not be upheld under such an 
[6-8] In interpreting a statute it is the 
duty of the court to ascertain and give 
effect to the intent and purpose of the 
legislature. In re Lehman, 93 Wash.2d 25, 
27, 604 P.2d 948 (1980). Statutes in pari 
materia must be construed together in as-
certaining legislative intent in order to give 
each statute meaning and validity. Kirk v. 
Miller, 83 Washed 777, 522 P.2d 843 (1974). 
Mr. Hopp correctly points out that RCW 
28A.67.065 predated RCW 28A.67.072. The 
legislature is presumed to be familiar with 
its prior enactments when creating a new 
statute. Baker v. Baker, 91 Wash.2d 482, 
486, 588 P.2d 1164 (1979). RCW 28A.67.072 
states in part: 
This section provides the exclusive means 
for nonrenewing the employment con-
tract of a provisional employee and no 
other provision of law shall be applicable 
thereto 
(Italics ours.) Because the foregoing provi-
sion followed RCW 28A.67.065, we believe 
the legislature did not intend the probation-
ary requirements of the latter statute be 
applied to provisional teachers. RCW 
28A.67.072 merely refers to section .065 to 
insure the determination by the superin-
tendent is subject to the evaluation require-
ments of that section. No mention is "made 
in section .072 of probation requirements 
under section .065. 
[9] Although the probationary period 
set out in section .065 refers to "every em-
ployee whose work is judged unsatisfac-
tory" the legislature, in the same para-
graph, noted that "P]ack of necessary im-
provement shall be specifically documented 
in writing . . . and shall constitute grounds 
for a finding of probable cause under . . . 
RCW 28A.67.070 [tenured employee stat-
ute], as now or hereafter amended." The 
legislature made no mention of nonrenewal 
under RCW 28A.67.072 which is good reason 
to believe the probationary requirements of 
analysis unless the state establishes a compel-
ling interest. Nielsen v. BMT Association, 90 
Washed 818, 820. 585 R2d 1191 (1978). 
5. See note I. 
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• • :o not apply to provisional 
.nally, we note the provi-
:ire first year is a pro ba-
ch would make the place-
on probation illogical and 
-instruction should be giv-
i statute which leads to absurdity. 
._ -i v. Lund 7d W*ah.2d 945, 447 P.2d 
718 (1968). 
" equentlv, we find RCW 28A.67.072 
s oniy that the superintendent's de-
termination not to renew a provisional em-
ployee's contract be made in accordance 
with the evaluation criteria set forth in 
RCW 28A.67.065. There is no requirement 
that provisional employees be placed on pro-
bation on or before February 1 of the school 
year as a precondition for nonrenewal. 
Having determined the District complied 
with the evaluation criteria, we find no 
error.1 
[H»J r'-na.
 rf u * Hopp maintains the 
P ' b t r c t is contractually bound to apply the 
t.t"-» ^ of RCW 28A.67.065 because of a 
4iteti employees evaluation policy be-
"ertificated employees and the Oro-
'iucation Association. Section 5.1 of 
Jea that an unsatisfactory 
i shall include a program 
\. the employee in improv-
nce. 
lal employees. <^ * 
equirement into tne 
-is note Mr. Hopp signed 
d oun tract as a : isional certified teacher 
with the Oroville School District That coo-
tract provided in par t : 
S. Mr. Hopp"s reliance on Wojt v. Chimactun 
School Dtst 49. 9 Wash.App. 857, 516 P.2d 
1099 (1973), and Van Horn v. Highline School 
Dist. 401, 17 Waah.App. 170. 562 P.2d 641 
(1977) is misplaced. He concedes Wojt was 
not a flrst-year teacher and was discharged 
under RCW 28A.58.100. Additionally. Wojt 
was decided before the enactment of RCW 
28A.67.072. Van Horn, likewise, was not a 
first-year teacher. The conclusion reached in 
Wojt was that a failure of a teacher to substan-
tially correct work-related deficiencies subse-
quent to a probationary period may be used to 
This contract is subject to nonrenewal 
by the District in the first year of em-
ployment in accordance with chapter 223, 
Laws of 1969, ex. sess. as last amended 
and added to by section 1, chapter 114, 
Laws of 1976, 2nd ex. sess. 
(RCW 28A.67.072). The face of the con-
tract between Mr. Hopp and the District 
clearly evidences an intent that nonrenewal 
would be governed by the provisions of 
section .072. 
Although we see no harm in the Distz ict s 
formulating a specific program to aid provi 
sional employees in overcoming deficiencies 
it is up to the legislature, not the courts, to 
decide on the wisdom and utility of legisla-
tion. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 83 
S.Ct. 1028, 10 L.Ed.2d 93, 95 A.L.R.2d 1347 
(1963). 
Having decided the foregoing issu* 
next address the dism.ssa: :* Mr 
writ of certiorar 
[11] The grounds 
certiorari are contai: 
A writ of review shall be granted by 
any court, except a police or justice court, 
when an inf~ oard or offi-
cer, exercisir :ons, has ex-
ceeded the j -*• ' 
board or off* 
to ".or*-
r»g, 'ji i iAAJdiuih 
course of the common law, and there 
appeal, nor in the judgment of the c-
any plain, speedy and adequate remedy at. 
!*w 
Although the superior courts are' vested 
with inherent authority to review a contro-
versy under a writ of certiorari, a threshold 
showing must be made of one of the 
constitute "sufficient cause" for discharge. 
Wojt. supra, 9 Wash.App. at 862. 516 P2d 
1099; Potter v. Richland School Dist. 400, 13 
Wash.App. 316, 322. 534 P.2d 577 (1975). The 
term "sufficient cause" only relates to the "ten-
ured teacher statute". RCW 28A.67.070, not to 
the mere statement of reason(s) under the 
"provisional teacher statute". RCW 28A.67.-
072. Had Mr. Hopp been other than a first-
year provisional teacher, solely governed by 
the dictates of RCW 28A.67.072 as discussed 
above, the probational requirements of RCW 
28A.67.065 would be applicable. 
HALSTED v. SALLEE 
Cite as, WastuApPx 83* P2A 877 
Wash. 877 
grounds set forth above. Mr. Hopp has 
made no showing the Board exceeded its 
jurisdiction or that the proceedings were 
erroneous, void, or contrary to common law. 
The court, finding no violation of law or 
contract, properly denied review under the 
writ 
The judgment of the superior court is 
affirmed. 
GREEN and ROE, JJ., concur. 
KCYNUMBCR SYSTEM V 
31 Wash.App. 193 
Sandra Lee HALSTED, formerly 
Sallee, Respondent, 
v. 
Donald Eugene SALLEE, Appellant 
No. 4191-nW. 
Court of Appeals of Washington, 
Division 3, Panel 4. 
Jan. 21, 1982. 
Former wife sought modification of 
former husband's visitation rights. The Su-
perior Court, Okanogan County, B. E. 
Kohls, J., entered judgment terminating all 
parental rights of former husband, enjoin-
ing former husband from personal contacts 
of any nature with any member of former 
wife's present family, including his two mi-
nor children, and restricting his travel dur-
ing pendency of case. Former husband ap-
pealed. The Court of Appeals, Roe, J., held 
that: (1) where no petition was filed seek-
ing termination of former husband's paren-
tal rights and determination of parental 
rights took place without due notice to hus-
band, termination would be reversed, and 
(2) restriction on travel imposed on former 
husband was an unconstitutional prohibi-
tion of former husband's right to travel 
Affirmed in part and reversed in part 
1. Constitutional Law *=»274(5) 
A parent's right to control and to have 
custody of his children is a fundamental 
civil right which may not be interfered with 
without the complete protection of due 
process safeguards. 
2. Infants <fc»l94 
Termination of former husband's pa-
rental rights, made in proceeding on former 
wife's petition for modification of visitation 
rights, in absence of petition seeking such 
termination, in absence of due notice to 
husband, and in absence of finding that 
statutory requisites for termination of pa-
rental rights had been established by clear, 
cogent and convincing evidence was invalid 
and would be reversed. West's RCWA 13.-
34.010 et seq., 13.34.090,13.34.110,1334.120, 
13.34.180(1-6), 13.34.190. 
3. Constitutional Law *=»242.1(1) 
The right to travel is a fundamental 
right protected by the equal protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment U.S. 
C.A.ConstAmend. 14. 
4. Constitutional Law <t»213.1(2) 
Where fundamental rights are in-
volved, regulations limiting these rights 
may be justified only by a compelling state 
interest 
' 5. Constitutional Law <t=»255(l), 278(1.1) 
Procedural due process demands that a 
deprivation of life, liberty or property be 
preceded by notice and opportunity for 
hearing appropriate to the nature of the 
case. 
6. Constitutional Law *=»251.6 
To be consonant with demands of pro-
cedural due process, notice and opportunity 
for hearing appropriate to nature of the 
case must be granted at a meaningful time 
and in a meaningful manner. 
7. Constitutional Law «=» 251.6 
An order based on a hearing in which 
there was not adequate notice or opportuni-
ty to be heard is .void. 
LEONARD v. CONVERSE 
Cite M 788 P2d 1 
Jean LEONARD, Appellant (Plaintiff), 
v. 
CONVERSE COUNTY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT NO. 2, Appellee 
(Defendant). 
No. 89-102. 
Supreme Court of Wyoming. 
March 13, 1990. 
Initial contract teacher brought action 
challenging termination of contract The 
District Court, Converse County, William 
A. Taylor, J., granted school district's mo-
tion for summary judgment, and teacher 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Macy, J., 
held that: (1) school district's evaluation 
rules did not provide protection for initial 
contract teacher from dismissal, and (2) 
neither implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing nor public policy exception to 
the employment-at-will doctrine apply to 
termination of employment contract be-
tween school districts and initial contract 
teachers. 
Affirmed. 
Golden, J., filed an opinion concurring 
in part and dissenting in part in which 
Urbigkit, J., joined. 
1. Schools <s=»147.6 
School district's evaluation policy did 
not protect initial contract teacher from 
dismissal, as the teacher could be dismissed 
even after receiving favorable evaluations. 
W.S.1977, § 21-7-109. 
2. Schools <3=147.6 
Although teacher's contract and stat-
utes incorporated school district's evalua-
tion policy and regulation, those rules did 
not create a contractual right of employ-
ment for initial contract teacher. W.S. 
1977, § 21-7-109. 
3. Master and Servant «=»30<1.10, 1.15) 
Implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing and public policy exception to the 
employment-at-will doctrine serves as ex-
ceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine 
COUNTY SCHOOL D. 2 Wyo H 1 9 
119 (Wvo 1990) 
by granting an employee greater nghts to 
sue his employer for termination of his 
employment. 
4. Schools <s=»147.6 
Implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing and public policy exception to the 
employment-at-will doctrine do not apply to 
termination of employment contracts be-
tween school districts and initial contract 
teachers 
5. Schools <s=>147.6 
School district's decision to terminate 
employment of a teacher without tenure 
must not violate constitutionally protected 
interest. 
Patrick E. Hacker, Cheyenne, for appel-
lant. 
J.N. Murdock of Reeves & Murdock, Cas-
per, and Mark R. Stewart of Hickey & 
Evans, Cheyenne, for appellee 
Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, 
URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ. 
MACY, Justice. 
Appellant Jean Leonard commenced an 
action against Appellee Converse County 
School District No. 2, seeking reinstate-
ment as a counselor, recovery of damages, 
and attorney's fees. The suit arose from 
the Converse County School Board's deci-
sion not to offer Leonard a contract as a 
continuing contract teacher after she had 
completed three years of employment as an 
initial contract teacher. The School Dis-
trict moved for a summary judgment, 
which the district court granted. 
We affirm. 
Leonard raises the following issues for 
our review: 
1. Whether it is arbitrary and capri-
cious for a school district to discharge an 
employee for reasons contrary to funda-
mental state policy? 
2. Whether it is arbitrary and capri-
cious for a school district to discharge a 
teacher by a procedure which violates the 
district's own rules and regulations? 
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3 Whether Appellant established a 
proper cause of ac^ tjon for breach of an 
express contract7 
4 Whether Appellant established a 
proper cause of action for breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing7 
5 Whether a teacher has a cause of 
action for breach of a statutory duty7 
6 Whether Appellant has established 
a valid claim for violation of substantive 
constitutional rights7 
7 Whether Appellant has established 
a claim for violation of due process7 
8 Whether material issues of fact ex-
ist as to each of the claims precluding 
summary judgment7 
The materials submitted m support of 
and in opposition to the School Distnct's 
motion for summary judgment reveal the 
following facts In the fall of 1982, Leon-
ard began working for the School District 
as a guidance counselor at the Glenrock 
Middle School The School District hired 
Leonard as an initial contract teacher, and 
she worked as such for three consecutive 
years l During Leonard's employment, the 
School District maintained a policy and reg-
ulation prescribing an evaluation proce-
dure The policy stated that all profession-
al staff would be evaluated to ensure a 
quality educational program, and it defined 
the specific areas which would be evaluat-
ed The regulation required that the pro-
gram and procedure for the evaluations 
and a written summary of expected stan-
dards be presented to the staff within two 
weeks of the beginning of the school year 
It also contained provisions for informal 
and formal probationary periods for teach-
ers with unsatisfactory evaluations. Both 
the regulation and WyoStat 
§ 21-3-110(aXxvu) (1977) required that ini-
tial contract teachers be evaluated in writ-
ing twice a year and receive copies of their 
evaluations 
In 1983, Leonard received a copy of her 
evaluation which indicated she needed lm-
I. WyoStat § 21-7-i02(a)(iv) (1977) defines an 
initial contract teacher as "(a]ny teacher who 
has not achieved continuing contract status." A 
continuing contract teacher is "(ajny initial con 
tract teacher who has been employed by the 
proved professional rapport The follow-
ing year, her evaluation noted improved 
rapport and indicated that all areas of per-
formance were satisfactory During her 
third year as a counselor, Leonard was not 
evaluated, and, through a letter dated 
March 15, 1985, the School Distnct in-
formed Leonard that it would terminate 
her initial contract at the end of the school 
year Leonard was never placed on proba-
tion under the terms of the evaluation reg-
ulation 
Leonard filed a gnevance with the School 
Board, seeking renewal of her contract. 
After a heanng, the School Board denied 
Leonard's request, and on September 5, 
1986, she filed a complaint with the distnct 
court The complaint alleged that the 
School Distnct and its employees (1) 
breached a legal duty owed to Leonard by 
failing to follow the evaluation and proba-
tionary procedures set out in WyoStat 
§§ 21-3-1 lOMxvn) and 21-3-1 U(aXviXB) 
(1977) and in its policies and regulations; 
(2) denied Leonard procedural due process 
at her gnevance heanng and failed to pro-
vide her with sufficient reasons for her 
dismissal, (3) discnmmated against her be-
cause of her sex and mantal status; (4) 
retaliated against her because of her per-
sonal life, (5) violated her substantive due 
process nghts by arbitranly and capncious-
ly dismissing her; (6) denied her nght to 
academic freedom, (7) violated her nght to 
continued employment; and (8) breached 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing Leonard sought reinstatement, 
damages, and attorney's fees under 42 
U S C §§ 1983, 1988, and 2000 (1982). 
Leonard also sought reinstatement and 
damages for the School District's negli-
gence, breach of contract, and violation of 
her constitutional nghts. 
The School Distnct answered, generally 
denying the allegations, and filed a motion 
for summary judgment The School Dis-
tnct's memorandum in support of its mo-
same school district in the state of Wyoming for 
a period of three (3) consecutive school years, 
and has had his contract renewed for a fourth 
consecutive school year" WyoStat 
§ 2l-7-i02(a)(ii)(A) (1977). 
LEONARD v CONVERSE 
Cite u 788 P2d 1 
tion maintained that it was entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law because Leon 
ard as an initial contract teacher, had no 
entitlement to or reasonable expectation 
of reemployment On April 12, 1989, the 
district court granted a summary judgment 
in favor of the School District In its deci 
sion letter the court, relying upon Roberts 
v Lincoln County School District Num-
ber One 676 P 2d 577 (Wyo 1984), stated 
that Leonard was an 'untenured" initial 
contract teacher whose employment was 
properly terminated The court further ex 
plained that the School Districts adminis 
trative rules could not abrogate the School 
Board's authority to terminate the employ 
ment of initial contract teachers.2 This ap 
peal arose from that decision 
The party moving for a summary judg-
ment has the initial burden of establishing 
that no genuine issue of material fact ex 
ists and that summary judgment should be 
granted as a matter of law If the movant 
establishes a prima facie case, the burden 
shifts to the party opposing the motion to 
present specific facts showing a genuine 
issue of material fact does exist Concluso-
ry statements or mere opinions are insuffi-
cient to satisfy an opposing party's burden 
Nelson v Crimson Enterprises, Inc, 111 
P 2d 73 (Wyo 1989), Jones Land and Live-
stock Co v Federal Land Bank of Oma-
ha, 733 P 2d 258 (Wyo 1987) 
Leonard contends that the School Dis-
trict's decision not to offer her a new con-
tract was arbitrary and capricious because 
the School District failed to follow the eval-
uation requirements set out in its policy, its 
regulation, and § 21-3-110(a)(xvii) In 
Roberts, 676 P 2d 577, this Court upheld a 
school district's decision to terminate the 
employment of an initial contract teacher 
despite its failure to follow required evalu-
ation procedures We explained 
The only statutory requirement for ter-
minating an initial contract teacher is 
2. Wyo Stat § 21-7-105 (1977) provided. 
An initial contract teacher who has taught 
in ihc system continuously for a period of ai 
least ninety (90) days shall be hired on an 
annual basis and shall be notified in writing 
of termination if such is the case, no later 
than March 15 of each year 
COUNTY SCHOOL D 2 Wyo H 2 1 
119 (Wyo 1990) 
that [the teacher] be notified of the ter-
mination no later than March 15 of each 
year An initial contract teacher has no 
statutory right to a statement of reasons 
for termination or to a hearing They do 
not have a claim, entitlement, or reason-
able expectation of re-employment 
Therefore they do not ha\e a property 
interest under state law or otherwise 
Id at 579 (footnote omitted)3 This Court 
also stated that the evaluation regulations 
established by the district did not alter the 
initial contract teachers rights because 
they 'were primarily for the benefit of the 
school district in performing its operational 
and supervisory duties " Id at 581 
[1] In this case the School District ar-
gues that it adopted the evaluation policy 
primarily for use in performing operational 
and supervisory duties and not for the pri-
mary purpose of protecting initial contract 
teachers We agree The evaluation rules 
did not protect initial contract teachers 
from dismissal because, as teachers with-
out tenure, they could be dismissed even 
after receiving favorable evaluations Id. 
In additon, the policy stated that the pri-
mary purpose for teacher supervision and 
evaluation was to develop staff and im-
prove teaching We hold that even if the 
evaluation rules had a secondary purpose 
relating to termination or retention, they 
did not give initial contract teachers a claim 
to, entitlement to, or reasonable expecta-
tion of reemployment Id. at 580 (citing 
Willis v Widefield School District No 3, 
43ColoApp 197, 603 P 2d 962 (1979)) The 
School District's failure to follow the evalu-
ation requirements did not result in an 
arbitrary and capncious decision to termi-
nate Leonard's employment 
Leonard also asserts that the School Dis-
trict's policy and regulation were incorpo-
rated into her employment contract and 
that the School District breached the con-
This section was amended in 1987 by substitut-
ing 'April for "March" 
3. In 1987 the legislature changed the date in 
Wyo^tat § 21-7-109 (1977) from March 15 to 
April 15 
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tract by failing to follow them 4 In Rob-
erts, 676 P 2d 577, this Court addressed the 
same breach of contract issue which was 
premised on similar contractual provisions 
We held that, "[although the contract is 
specifically subject to the 'policies, rules, 
and regulations of the school district,' 
these particular provisions did not operate 
to afford appellant any contractual right of 
employment" Id. at 582 We also stated 
that the board could not abrogate its statu-
tory authonty to terminate initial contract 
teachers Id. 
[2] In this case, Leonard's contract and 
Wyo Stat § 21-7-112 (1977) incorporated 
the evaluation policy and regulation, but 
those rules did not create a contractual 
right of employment A contrary result 
would be m conflict with a school district's 
authonty to terminate the employment of 
initial contract teachers Wyo Stat 
§ 21-7-105 (1977), Roberts, 676 P 2d 577 
Section 21-7-112 specifically states that 
school district policies, rules, and regula-
tions cannot be m conflict with Wyoming 
laws Thus, we hold that the School Dis-
trict's violation of its evaluation policy and 
regulation and of § 21-3-1 lO(aXxvn) did 
not constitute an actionable breach of con-
tract 
[3] Leonard also asks this Court to 
adopt and apply the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing and the public 
policy exception to the employment-at-will 
doctnne Both theones serve as excep-
4. The following two contract provisions apply to 
Leonard's assertion 
4 It is understood and agreed between the 
parties that this contract is subject to the 
applicable laws of the State of Wyoming, the 
duly adopted rules of the State Board of Edu-
cation and the policies of this District which 
are, by reference, incorporated herein and 
made a part of this agreement the same as if 
fully set forth herein. 
6. Any person signing a contract for a 
fourth consecutive full school year shall be 
placed on a renewable contract status pursu-
ant to Section 21-7-102. Education Code of 
1969 as amended, 1981 
WycStaL § 21-7-102(a)(u) (1977) states in per-
tinent part 
"Continuing Contract Teacher"—(A) Any 
initial contract teacher who has been em-
ployed by the same school district in the state 
tions to the employment-at-will doctnne by 
granting an employee greater nghts to sue 
his employer for termination of his employ-
ment Nelson, 111 P 2d 73, Wagenseller 
v Scottsdale Memorial Hospital, 147 Anz 
370, 710 P 2d 1025 (1985) This Court has 
previously held that the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing does not 
apply to at-will employment relationships 
because either party may terminate an at-
will contract for any reason, without rea-
son, or for the wrong reason Mobil Coal 
Producing, Inc v Parks, 704 P 2d 702 
(Wyo 1985) We have recognized a limited 
cause of action to vindicate the public poli-
cy of compensating workers for work-relat-
ed mjunes Gness v Consolidated 
Freightways Corporation of Delaware, 
776 P 2d 752 (Wyo 1989) * 
[4] We now hold that the implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing and the 
public policy exception to the employment-
at-will doctnne do not apply to the termi-
nation of employment contracts between 
school districts and initial contract teach-
ers The adoption of these theones would 
alter the tenure status of initial contract 
teachers defined m Wyo Stat § 21-7-109 
(1977) and explained m Roberts, 676 P 2d 
577 The power to modify that status be-
longs to the legislature 
Leonard's remaining arguments relate to 
her claim that the School District's decision 
not to offer her a fourth contract was made 
of Wyoming for a period of three (3) consecu-
tive school years and has had his contract 
renewed for a fourth consecutive school 
year (1 
Wyo Slat § 21-7-112 (1977) provides. 
The contracts of all teachers in the state of 
Wyoming from and after the effective date of 
this act shall be subject to the policies, rules, 
and regulations of the school district not tn 
conflict with this law or the other laws of the 
state of Wyoming 
(Emphasis added) 
3. In Gness. 776 P 2d at 754, we held that an 
employee 
whose employment is terminated for exercis-
ing nghts under the worker's compensation 
statutes and who is not covered by the terms 
of a collective bargaining agreement has a 
cause of action in tort against the employer 
for damages. 
LEONARD v CONVERSE 
Cite u 788 PJ2d 1 
on the basis of constitutional impermissi-
ble grounds Leonard contends that she is 
entitled to relief under 42 U S C § 1983 
(1982) because the School District termmat 
ed her employment due to her marital sta 
tus, her residency her personal life and 
the fact that she reported incest cases to 
government agencies 8 
[5] Leonard correctly states that a 
school districts decision to terminate the 
employment of a teacher without tenure 
must not violate constitutionally protected 
interests Perry v Stndermann 408 U S 
593, 92 S Ct 2694, 33 L Ed 2d 570 (1972), 
Roberts, 676 P2d 577 To prevail under 
this principle however, Leonard must first 
meet her burden in opposing the School 
District's motion for summary judgment 
Jones Land an*d Livestock Co, 733 P2d 
258 In Nelson, 111 P 2d at 77, we stated 
that "[ejvidence opposing a summary judg-
ment that is conclusory or speculative is 
insufficient and the trial court has no duty 
to anticipate possible proof In opposition 
to the School District's motion Leonard 
presented the depositions of the Glenrock 
Middle School principal, the school district 
superintendent, and five school board mem-
bers After reviewing those depositions, 
we conclude that Leonard failed to demon-
strate the existence of a genuine issue of 
material fact which would preclude summa-
ry judgment as a matter of law The mate-
rials supporting Leonard's contention that 
the School District terminated her employ-
ment in violation of her constitutionally 
protected rights were merely speculative 
and conclusory Hence, the School District 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law 
Affirmed 
GOLDEN, J, filed an opinion concurring 
in part and dissenting in part in which 
URBIGKIT, J, joined 
6. Leonard also asserts that the School District 
deprived her of her property right in continued 
employment without due process in violation of 
the fourteenth amendment to the United States 
Constitution This argument has no merit be 
cause we have determined that Leonard, as an 
COUNTS SCHOOL D Z Wyo H 2 3 
119 (Wvo 19*» 
GOLDEN' Jubtice, concurring in part 
and dissenting in part, in which 
URBIGKIT J joins 
Although I concur in most aspects of the 
majority opinion I dissent from that part 
of it that holds that "the pubhc policy ex-
ception to the employment at will doctrine 
[does] not applv to the termination of em-
ployment contracts between school districts 
and initial contract teachers " 
This court identified the rationale sup-
porting the public pohcy exception to the 
at will rule m Allen v Safeway Stores, 
Incorporated 699 P2d 277, 284 (Wyo 
1985) 
A tort action premised on violation of 
public policy results from a recognition 
that allowing a discharge to go unre-
dressed would leave a valuable social pol-
icy to go unvmdicated 
As it was so aptly put by the Arizona 
Supreme Court m Wagner v City of Globe, 
150 Ariz 82, 722 P 2d 250, 255-56 (1986), 
[ejmployees should not have to choose 
between their jobs and the demands of 
important public policy interests • • • 
[E]mployees should not be discharged be-
cause they performed an act that pubhc 
policy would encourage • • • 
A fundamental principle of Wyoming's 
public policy is our commitment to protect 
children from abuse or neglect If a school 
distnct can decide not to renew a school 
counselors employment contract based in 
substantial part on that counselor's fulfill-
ing a statutory obligation of reporting sus-
pected child abuse and neglect and of coop-
erating with law enforcement authorities 
and child protection agencies, then very 
soon that school counselor will stop report-
ing and cooperating The unacceptable end 
result is that child abuse and neglect will 
go unreported and children will continue to 
be harmed 
Wyoming's clearly defined and well-es-
tablished pubhc policy concerning child 
initial contract teacher, did not have a claim to, 
entitlement to, or reasonable expectation of 
reemployment 
Wyo Stat § 14-3-205 (1977) imposes a duty 
to report cases of child abuse and neglect 
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abuse finds expression in W S 14-3-104 
through 215 (July 1986 Repl) In particu 
lar § 14-3-205(a) provides that any person 
who has reasonable cause to suspect that a 
child has been abusecl*or neglected shall 
immediately report it to the child protection 
agency or local law enforcement agency 
Under § 14-3-205(b) if a staff member of 
a school suspects child abuse or neglect, 
that staff member shall notify as soon as 
possible a person in charge who is also 
responsible to report the matter But the 
reporting staff member is not relieved of 
his or her obligation to report in the first 
instance Under § 14-3-212, the creation 
of multi-disciplinary child protection teams 
within the communities in the state is en-
couraged Among the members of that 
team is a designated representative from 
the school district. The local child protec 
tion teams are to facilitate diagnosis and 
prognosis and provide an adequate treat 
ment plan for the child and the child's 
family Under § 14-3-214, a child counsel-
or employed by the school may attend in-
terviews of a child that are conducted on 
school property by law enforcement per-
sonnel or child protective agency personnel 
School counselors and teachers in partic-
ular are serving in the trenches in our 
society's war against child abuse Any 
chilling of that obligation to report and 
cooperate cannot be tolerated Our chil-
dren are much too precious and valuable a 
resource to be sacrificed in the name of the 
"at-will" doctrine We have recognized 
and adopted a public policy exception for 
the worker who files a worker s compensa-
tion claim Gness v Consolidated 
Freightways Corporation of Delaware, 
776 P 2d 752 (Wyo 1989) This court surely 
has the courage to recognize and adopt a 
public policy exception which will mure to 
the benefit of abused and neglected chil-
dren 
Keeping this public policy in mind, our 
fidelity to the bedrock principles of summa-
ry judgment law requires us to examine 
the record in the light most favorable to 
Ms Leonard, the party against whom the 
summary judgment was entered, and give 
her the benefit of all favorable inferences 
which reasonably can be drawn from the 
record evidence 
The record evidence surrounding the rea-
sons for principal Dodd's recommendation 
that Ms Leonard's employment contract 
not be renewed shows the following 
1 Leonard's deposition testimony 
And Mr Dodd * * * said to me, 
something about don t discover any 
more incest cases and he kind of 
laughed And I guess I had a little 
difficulty with that I didn t think it 
was very funny * * " I felt that he 
really meant it * * * ' 
2 Dodd's deposition testimony 
• When asked if he intended that Ms 
Leonard should not work with incest 
and abuse matters and alcoholic par-
ents Dodd testified, "It would be my 
intent that [she] recognize the limit to 
which a school counselor can do that 
and still do the normal things • • • " 
• When asked if she did more for 
abused children than Dodd wanted her 
to do, Dodd testified, 4I would have to 
say in terms of the total context of the 
job she spent more time with them 
than could be provided within the 
_ school setting at the expense of the 
other group of students ' 
• When asked if the special cases 
were taking more time than Dodd felt 
she could afford as a counselor, Dodd 
answered, "Unfortunately yes " 
• Against the backdrop of the 
amount of time involved m reporting 
abuse cases and in cooperating with 
investigations by the law enforcement 
authorities in such cases, Dodd testi-
fied, "For the way all of this impacted 
upon the total school program, it was 
my professional judgment that too 
much time was being spent there." 
3 Assistant school superintendent 
Hoyt's deposition testimony 
• In early March, Hoyt asked Dodd to 
explain why he did not recommend Ms 
Leonard for renewal of her contract 
Hoyt testified, "If I can recall his 
phrasing, there was a lack of balance 
between dealing with those more se-
vere cases and what he perceived as 
ARLAND 
Cite as 788 ?2d 
being her major responsibility as far as 
a school counselor was concerned." 
• According to Hoyt, Dodd's reasons 
for his nonrenewal recommendation 
were her need to listen, her rapport 
with other staff members, and the 
"balance." 
After reviewing the record and evidence 
in the light most favorable to school coun-
selor Leonard and being of the view that 
Wyoming has a clearly defined and well-es-
tablished public policy regarding the re-
porting of child abuse and neglect and of 
cooperating with the authorities in such 
matters, I find that genuine issues of mate-
rial fact exist concerning the school dis-
trict's reasons for failing to renew Ms. 
Leonard's contract I would reverse and 
remand for a jury trial on that issue. 
J7\ 
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Susan A. ARLAND, Petitioner 
(Defendant), 
v. 
STATE of Wyoming, 
Respondent (Plaintiff). 
No. 89-145. 
Supreme Court of Wyoming. 
March 15, 1990. 
Defendant petitioned for a writ of <&r-
tiorari, challenging the trial court's refusal 
to rule on a motion for reduction of sen-
tence. The Supreme Court, Urbigkit, J.f 
held that the trial court had a reasonable 
amount of time to rule on a timely motion 
for reduction of sentence, even if the mo-
tion had not been decided within 120 days 
after imposition of sentence. 
Remanded. 
v. STATE Wyo. H 2 5 
1123 (Wyo. 1990) 
Criminal Law «=996(2, 3) 
Tnal court has "reasonable time" to 
rule on motion for reduction of sentence 
which is filed within 120 days after imposi-
tion of sentence, even if motion is not de-
cided within 120 days after sentence. 
Rules Cnm.Proc, Rule 36. 
Leonard D. Munker, State Public Defend-
er and M. David Lmdsey, Cheyenne, for 
petitioner. 
Joseph B Meyer, Atty. Gen., John W. 
Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Karen A. 
Byrne, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., Theodore 
Lauer, Director of Prosecution Assistance 
Program, and Philip W. Jussel, Student 
Intern, for respondent. 
Before CARDINE, CJ., and THOMAS, 
URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ. 
URBIGKIT, Justice. 
This appeal involves the prospective-ret-
rospective status of changes this court has 
made by amendments to the Wyoming 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Specifically 
addressed is W.R.Cr.P. 36 (similar to the 
prior F.R.Cr.P. 35) relating to authority of 
the trial court to alter or amend a criminal 
sentence after entry. 
Petitioner, Susan A. Arland, plead guilty 
to embezzlement and larceny by bailee in 
taking money from her employer, The 
Learning Center of Teton County, as of-
fenses charged in multiple counts. On 
March 27, 1987, she was sentenced to con-
finement at the Wyoming Women's Center 
for a term of three to five years and re-
quired to make restitution of $38,889.83, 
which was "reduced to judgment" by the 
sentence. Arland, thirty-nine and divorced, 
had a fourteen year old daughter and no 
previous criminal involvement 
On July 7, 1987, Arland moved for a 
sentence reduction premised on a favorable 
report from the women's confinement insti-
tution. The county attorney objected and 
the formal official record then ends without 
any action on her motion.1 After receipt of 
1. After the record was Hied in this court, it was supplemented by court order authorizing Ar-
ROBERTS v. LINCOLN COUNTY SCH. DIST. NO ONE 
Cite as 676 P.2d 577 (Wvo 1984) 
Wyo 577 
Procedure, § 609, fn 14, p 207 (12th ed 
1976) 
[3] In this case the sentencing judge 
had all the pertinent information before 
him He listened to the appellant, his at-
torney, and several character witnesses, he 
had the benefit of a presentence report 
The statute to which appellant pled guilty 
allows for a sentence not to exceed five 
years The judge sentenced appellant to a 
period withm that statutory maximum and 
gave his reasons therefor We cannot say 
that this was a clear abuse of discretion 
We affirm 
|MYHUMM»VrtUM^ 
Shirley ROBERTS, Appellant (Plaintiff), 
v. 
LINCOLN COUNTY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT NUMBER ONE, 
Appellee (Defendant). 
No. 83-125. 
Supreme Court of Wyoming. 
Feb 16, 1984. 
Initial contract teacher appealed from 
the decision of the District Court, Lincoln 
County, John D Troughton, J, upholding 
the school board's decision to terminate 
her. The Supreme Court, Cardme, J., held 
that (1) initial contract teacher had no 
statutory right to a statement of reasons 
for termination, or to a hearing, and had no 
claim, entitlement, or reasonable expecta-
tion of employment, or a property interest 
under state law or otherwise; (2) even if 
evaluation of teacher had been performed, 
aa required by school board regulations, 
and had been favorable, teacher would not 
have been protected against an arbitrary or 
capncious discharge, (3) such policy of 
evaluations did not give teacher a constitu-
tionally protected property right in the re-
newal of her contract and, therefore, fail-
ure to follow such policy did not affect 
decision to terminate, (4) such policy of 
evaluation did not operate to afford teacher 
any contractual right of employment, and 
(5) teacher did not meet her burden of 
proving that her termination was caused by 
impermissible reasons or that constitution-
ally protected rights were involved 
Affirmed 
1. Schools <*=»141(5) 
An initial contract teacher has no stat-
utory right to a statement of reasons for 
termination or to a hearing, and has no 
claim, entitlement, or reasonable expecta-
tion of reemployment, and, therefore, does 
not have a property interest under state 
law or otherwise W S 1977, § 21-7-105 
2. Schools <s=>55 
School board is the governing body of 
the school district and has wide discretion 
in the management of school affairs. 
3. Schools «=»55 
Supreme Court will interfere with 
school board actions if they are arbitrary 
and capricious or fraudulent, however, 
such Court will not otherwise substitute its 
judgment and, absent abuse, will not inter-
fere with the exercise of discretionary acts 
authorized by statute 
4. Administrative Law and Procedure 
<s»416 
In some circumstances, agencies may 
depart from their own regulations 
5. Schools <*=»141(4) 
Even if teaching evaluation had been 
performed, as contemplated in school board 
policy, and had been favorable, initial con-
tract teacher would not have been protect-
ed against an arbitrary or capncious dis-
charge since such teachers can be dis-
missed for no reason at all. 
6. Schools <8=>141<4) 
If an initial contract teacher can be 
dismissed for no reason at all, such teacher 
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can be dismissed without reasons sup-
ported by facts 
7 Schools <3=»141(5) 
School board's policy that evaluations 
should be made of all teachers did not give 
initial contract teacher a constitutionally 
protected property right in the renewal of 
her contract since such policj, which was 
violated by the school board established 
evaluative policies not designed for the pro-
tection of nontenured teachers that is, 
their purpose was not termination or reten-
tion, but were primarily for the benefit of 
the school district in performing its opera-
tional and supervisory duties, failure to 
follow such policy did not affect decision to 
terminate teacher 
8. Administrative Law and Procedure 
*=>763 
Although agency should be aware of 
its regulations and such regulations should 
be followed, in order to invalidate an agen 
cy's decision, regulation in question must 
have some connection with the decision 
9. Schools «»141(5) 
Only requirements that school board 
must satisfy before terminating an initial 
contract teacher, are that the teacher must 
be notified no later than March 15 of each 
year and heanng must be provided if there 
is an allegation that teacher's constitution-
al nghts have been violated W S 1977, 
§ 21-7-105 
10. Schools «=>141(5) 
School board's termination of initial 
contract teacher was proper where it noti-
fied such teacher no later than March 15 
and hearing was provided in the event she 
alleged that her constitutional rights had 
been violated. WS.1977, § 21-7-105. 
11. Schools e»141(5) 
Although initial contract teacher's con-
tract was specifically subject to the poli-
cies, rules and regulations of the school 
district, her termination because of difficul-
ty m her coaching assignments was proper, 
even though the school board regulation 
requiring evaluation of teachers was not 
followed by the school board prior to her 
termination where no particular rule or 
regulation of the school district required 
evaluation of teacher in the coaching 
duties, and failure to evaluate her in such 
duties could not and did not matter since 
the specific provision that an initial con-
tract teacher could be dismissed at the 
discretion of the school board with or with-
out cause was controlling 
12. Schools <3=>141(2) 
School board cannot abrogate its statu-
tory power to terminate nontenured teach-
ers by contract 
13 Schools <s=»141(4) 
Lack of tenure does not, in itself, de-
feat a claim that decision to terminate was 
based upon impermissible violations of con-
stitutionally protected interests 
14 Civil Rights «=»13.13(1) 
While a nontenured teacher may not be 
terminated from employment for exercising 
a constitutional right of free speech, that 
person has burden of proving that the 
speech or conduct was constitutionally pro-
tected U S C A ConstAmend. 1. 
15. Constitutional Law <3»82(12) 
Academic freedom concerns constitu-
tionally protected nghts and does not give 
teacher the right to have discipline prob-
lems nor to be protected from termination 
merely because such teacher was not 
aware that the administrators were dissat-
isfied with the direction of teacher's coach-
ing program U.SC.A Const.Amend. 1. 
16. Civil Rights «=»13.13(3) 
Initial contract teacher did not meet 
burden of proving that her termination was 
caused by impermissible reasons nor that 
constitutionally protected nghts were in-
volved where there was no evidence she 
was terminated for any protected activity 
but evidence showed she was terminated 
because she could not handle the discipline 
and morale problems of her sports teams. 
U S C A ConstAmend. 1. 
Patnck E Hacker of Graves, Hacker & 
Phelan, Cheyenne, for appellant. 
ROBERTS v LINCOLN COUNTY SCH DIST. NO ONE 
Cite SJ 676 PJd 577 (Wyo 1984) 
w>o 579 
Dennis L Sanderson, Afton for appellee 
Before ROONEY, C J THOMAS ROSE 
and CARDINE, JJ and RAPER, Justice, 
Ret 
CARDINE, Justice 
This appeal is from a judgment uphold-
ing the Lincoln County School Board's deci 
sion to terminate the employment of appel 
lant We will affirm 
The issues, as stated by appellant, are 
"1 Is a decision of a school board made 
in violation of its own policies and rules 
arbitrary and capricious7 
"2 Does a violation of school board pol-
icies incorporated into an employment 
contract, constitute an actionable breach 
of contract7 
"3 Is the nonrenewal of an initial con 
tract teacher for educational philosophies 
or methods without previous warning a 
violation of constitutionally protected 
rights7" 
Appellant, Shirley Roberts, was em-
ployed by the Lincoln County School Dis-
trict No One in 1977 as a physical educa-
tion teacher and the high school girls vol-
leyball and basketball coach Dunng her 
second year of teaching, she experienced 
difficulties as a basketball coach and was 
relieved of these duties Her third year of 
teaching involved coaching the high school 
volleyball team and the eighth grade girls 
basketball team Dunng the third year, 
appellant ran into difficulties with the vol-
leyball team The students who created 
problems on the volleyball team also creat-
ed problems in one of appellant's PE. 
classes. The superintendent and principal 
evidently decided that it would be better to 
get a different physical education teacher 
who could handle both the P E classes and 
the coaching duties 
Appellant was told by the superintendent 
that he was not going to recommend that 
her contract be renewed because he was 
1. Section 21-7-105 W.S 1977, provides 
"An imual contract teacher who has taught in 
the system continuously for a penod of at 
least ninety (90) days shall be hired on an 
not satisfied with the direction the coaching 
program was going The Board of Trus-
tees accepted the superintendent s recom-
mendation and sent appellant a letter for-
mally notifying her of this decision The 
letter stated that as an initial contract 
teacher she was not entitled to a hearing 
upon the reasons for termination, but that 
she did ha\e a right to a hearing on the 
issue of whether or not her constitutional 
or due process rights had been violated 
Appellant asked for a heanng which was 
held before an independent hearing examin-
er who made proposed findings of facts 
a.nd conclusions of law The Board of 
Trustees incorporated these findings into 
its decision and order Appellant appealed 
the board s decision to district court In 
addition to the appeal, the appellant alleged 
breach of contract and a federal civil rights 
action The court announced its decision in 
favor of appellee on all counts 
I 
Whether the school board's decision was 
arbitrary and capricious 
[1] Appellant contends that the school 
board had m effect a manual of Policies 
and Regulations which were not followed, 
and, therefore, their decision was pnma 
facie arbitrary and capricious Appellant 
was an initial contract teacher The only 
statutory requirement for terminating an 
initial contract teacher is that they be noti-
fied of the termination no later than March 
15 of each yearl An initial contract teach-
er has no statutory right to a statement of 
reasons for termination or to a heanng. 
They do not have a claim, entitlement, or 
reasonable expectation of re-employment 
Therefore, they do not have a property 
interest under state law or otherwise. 
O'Melia v Sweetwater County School Dis-
trict No 1, Wyo, 497 P2d 540 (1972); 
Schmidt v Fremont County School Dis-
trict No 25, 406 F^upp 781 (Wyo 1976), 
annual basis and shall be notified in writing 
of termination, if such is the case, no later 
than March 15 of each year M 
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Bertot v School Ehstnct /Vo / Albany 
County, Wyoming, 522 F id 1171 (10th 
Cir 1975) 
[2,31 The school board is the governing 
body of the school district It has wide 
discretion in the management of school af 
fairs Hyatt v Big Horn School District 
No I Wyo, 636 P2d 525 (1981) The 
board has the power to employ teachers, 
§ 21-3-lll(a)(vi)(C), W S 1977 approve 
salary provisions, § 21-7-104 W S 1977, 
terminate initial contract teachers § 21-7-
105, W S1977, and suspend or dismiss 
teachers, § 21-7-110, W S 1977 We will 
interfere with school board actions if they 
are arbitrary and capricious or fraudulent, 
however, we will not otherwise substitute 
our judgment Absent abuse we will not 
interfere with the exercise of discretionary 
acts authorized by statute Hyatt v Big 
Horn School District No 4, supra 
Appellant received one formal evaluation 
during the school year in which her con-
tract was not renewed Although appel 
lant did not have a property right to reem-
ployment, she nevertheless contends that 
because policies and regulations of the 
school district requiring four evaluations 
during the school year2 were not followed, 
the decision to terminate must be reversed 
Appellant contends that the school dis 
tnct's failure to follow its own evaluative 
policies and regulations is patently arbi-
trary and capncious, and relies upon Vitar-
elh v Seaton, 359 U S 535, 79 S Ct 968, 3 
2. "EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STAFF 
TEACHERS 
"Formal valuations for nontenure teachers 
shall be made at least four times each year on 
forms to be provided The first two evalua-
tions shall be completed before December, 
and the second two before March of each 
school year 
The minimum basic procedures leading to 
formal evaluations of teachers shall include 
the following* 
"1 The principal or his designated represent 
ative (assistant principal, district administra 
tor and/or supervisor) shall visit each teach 
er in the classroom several times during each 
school year and shall record the general na-
ture of visitations on a form to be provided, 
with a copy for the teacher and the principal 
L Ed 2d 1012 (1959) for the proposition that 
when an agency promulgate* regulations, a 
failure to act in accordance with the proce-
dures set forth therein cannot be sustained 
We accepted this principle in keslar v Po-
lice Cunl Service Comm'n, City of Rock 
Spring* Wyo 665 P2d 937 (1983) Kes-
lar and Vitarelh stand for the proposition 
that an individual whose status or position 
is being affected by agency action has the 
right to enforce those agency rules which 
were promulgated and designed to afford 
protection in the given situation 
[4J However in some circumstances 
agencies may depart from their own regu-
lations Thus 
" • • • Most courts which have allowed 
departures have based their conclusions 
on findings that the regulation which 
was violated was intended to govern in-
ternal agenc> procedures, rather than to 
protect any interest of the objecting par-
ty * • ' * (Footnotes omitted) 87 
Harvard L Rev 629, Violations by Agen-
cies of their own Regulations 
Willis v Wide field School District No 3, 
43 Colo App 197 603 P 2d 962 (1979), in-
volved nontenured teachers and school dis-
trict procedures which required teachers to 
be evaluated twice a year The policy stat-
ed that this requirement had the primary 
purpose of improving the quality of teach-
ing and the secondary purpose of retention 
or dismissal The court held that a failure 
to follow the evaluation procedures did not 
All observations shall be conducted openly 
and with the full knowledge of the teacher A 
teacher or the principal or his designated rep-
resentative may request a conference to dis-
cuss the visit 
2 At least once each year in the case of 
tenure teachers, and at least twice each year 
tn the case of nontenure teachers, the princi-
pal or his designated representative shall 
schedule a formal evaluative interview with 
each teacher pnor to the evaluation deadlines 
established 
"Current practice codified 1978 
Board approved and issued date of manual 
adoption 
'School District No 1, Lincoln County, Kenv 
merer Wyoming" (Emphasis added ) 
ROBERTS v LINCOLN COUNTY SCH DIST NO ONE Wyo 5 g l 
Cite a* 676 ?2d 577 (Wyo 1984) 
invalidate a decision to terminate a nonten 
ured teacher 
The purpose for these evaluations is set 
forth in the manual of Policies and Regula 
tions of School District No One under 
Evaluation of Professional Staff Teachers 
and is stated as 
" ' * * to assist teachers to develop and 
strengthen their professional abilities 
through an assessment of strengths and 
weaknesses Teacher evaluation shall be 
a process through which the pnncipal 
provides guidelines, suggests ways to 
overcome difficulties, makes commenda 
taons, and determines the progress of a 
teacher's professional performance Ex 
ceptional performance by a staff member 
should also be recognized on such occa-
sion " 
In this case, the regulations establishing 
evaluative policies were not designed for 
the protection of nontenured teachers such 
as appellant, but were primarily for the 
benefit of the school district in performing 
its operational and supervisory duties 
[5-7] Their purpose was not termma 
tion or retention Even if the evaluations 
had been performed and been favorable, 
appellant would not have been protected 
against an arbitrary or capricious dis-
charge If one can be dismissed for no 
reason at all, one can be dismissed without 
reasons supported by facts Jeffries v 
Turkey Run Consolidated School Dis-
trict, 492 F 2d 1 (7th Cir 1974) The policy 
that evaluations should be made did not 
give appellant a constitutionally protected 
property nght in the renewal of her con-
tract See Weathers v West Yuma Coun-
ty School District R-J-ly 530 F2d 1335 
(10th Cir 1976) 
[81 We recognize the policy that agen-
cies should be aware of their regulations 
and that these regulations should be fol-
lowed However, m order to invalidate an 
agency's decision, the regulation in ques-
tion must have some connection with the 
decision Appellant was an initial contract 
teacher As such, she had no statutory or 
other legally protected property or interest 
m continuing employment We cannot find 
that the stated evaluation policies created a 
nght and therefore the failure to follow 
them did not affect the decision to termi-
nate 
In the present situation evaluations 
were required for classroom teachers Ap-
pellant was dismissed for reasons concern-
ing her outside duties as a coach She was 
not terminated for her classroom perform-
ance Appellant was relieved of her initial 
position as basketball coach because of dif-
ficulties In her third year of teaching, she 
experienced problems with the volleyball 
team These problems were characterized 
as morale and discipline problems The 
administrators evidently felt that they had 
a choice of relieving appellant of these 
duties also or of hiring a teacher who was 
adequate in both classroom performance 
and coaching abilities 
The cases cited by appellant in support of 
her position can be easily distinguished 
They either involve tenured teachers {Wojt 
v Chimacum School District No 49, 9 
Wash App 857 516 P 2d 1099 (1973), Bn-
ninstool v New Mexico State Board of 
Education 81 NM 319 466 P2d 885 
(1970)), or procedures specifically geared 
toward the purpose of termination (Tnm-
boli v Board of Education of Wayne 
County W V , 280 S E 2d 686 (1981), Leh-
man v Board of Education of City 
School District of City of New York, 82 
A D 2d 832, 439 N Y S 2d 670 (1981)) 
[9,10] We find that the procedures con-
cerning evaluation of probationary teachers 
are not related to the decision to retain or 
terminate a probationary teacher A sepa-
rate section of the school district's rules 
and regulations apply specifically to the 
termination, suspension, or dismissal of 
teachers and pupils This section states 
that 
"Section 2 Termination of Initial 
Contract Teachers The contract of an 
initial teacher may be terminated by the 
Board upon notification in writing of 
such termination by registered or certi-
fied mail to the last known address of 
such initial contract teacher no later than 
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March 15 of each year Proof of such 
written notice together with the proof of 
mailing shall be kept and retained in the 
records of the school district 
he only requirements that the board must 
atisfy before terminating an initial con 
ract teacher is that the teacher must be 
totified no later than March 15 of each 
ear and a hearing must be provided if 
here is an allegation that the teacher s 
onstitutionai rights have been violated 
The school district satisfied these require-
nents and acted properly in the termina 
ion of appellant 
II 
Did the violation of these policies con-
titute an actionable breach of contract7 
Appellant contends that the evaluation 
policies were incorporated into her teacher 
employment contract, and therefore, the 
school district s inaction regarding the eval-
uations resulted in a breach of contract 
The applicable contract provisions are 
"3 DUTIES OF TEACHER The teach 
er shall perform all duties and services 
of a teacher faithfully and satisfactorily 
at the time, place and for the duration 
prescribed by the District, and as direct 
ed by the superintendent Teachers shall 
comply with and abide by all rules and 
regulations promulgated by the District 
and all pertinent statutes of the State of 
Wyoming as they now exist or may from 
time to time be adopted or modified All 
such, rules, regulations and statutes 
are incorporated herein by this refer-
ence and are made a part of this agree-
ment as if fully set forth. * * 
• • • • • • 
"5 TERMINATION Until a teacher 
obtains continuing contract status as 
defined by the Wyoming Teacher Em-
ployment Law, the teacher hereby ac-
knowledges that he/she is employed on 
an annual probationary basis and has no 
expectation of re-employment An ini-
tial contract teachers contract may 
not be renewed solely at the discretion 
of the board of trustees with or without 
cause. Unless otherwise required by 
law an initul contract teacher is not 
entitled to a hearing upon the reasons 
for termination ' (Emphasis added ) 
Section 21-~-U2 WS1977 states that 
The contracts at all teachers in the 
state of Wyoming from and after the 
effectiv e date of this act shall be subject 
to the policies, rules, and regulations of 
the school district not in conflict with this 
law or the other laws of the state of 
Wyoming 
[11 121 Appellant contends that the pol-
icies and regulations are made part of her 
contract that they required evaluations 
that were not done and that the school 
district therefore, is in breach of contract. 
We cannot agree with this proposition Al-
though the contract is specifically subject 
to the 'policies, rules, and regulations of 
the school district,' these particular provi-
sions did not operate to afford appellant 
any contractual right of employment. 
In Illinois Education Ass'n Local Com-
munity High School District 218 v Board 
of Education of School District 218 Cook 
County 62 III id 127, 340 N £ 2d 7 (1975), 
the court held that a collective bargaining 
agreement providing that discharge should 
be preceded by the faithful exercise of 
evaluations could not result in the school 
board delegating its discretionary powers 
of terminating probationary teachers The 
court stated that the reasons for terminat-
ing were not related to classroom teaching 
performance, and there was nothing in the 
agreement which restricted or expanded 
the rights of the nontenured teacher 
Here, there are no particular rules or 
regulations requiring the evaluation of ap-
pellant in her coaching duties. Therefore, 
the failure to evaluate could not and did 
not matter The specific provision that an 
initial contract teacher can be dismissed at 
the discretion of the school board with or 
without cause a controlling. The board 
cannot abrogate its statutory power to ter-
minate nontenured teachers by contract, 
and that did not occur here. 
ROBERTS v. LINCOLN COUNTY SCH. DIST. NO. ONK Wvo 583 
Cite as 676 P2d 577 (Wyo. 1984) 
III 
Whether appellant's termination is im-
proper because it is based on the viola-
tion of constitutionally secured rights. 
[13-161 The general rule is that the 
lack of tenure does not, in itself, defeat a 
claim that the decision was based upon 
impermissible violations of constitutionally 
protected interests. Perry v. Sinder-
mann, 408 US. 593, 92 S Ct. 2694, 33 
L.Ed.2d 570 (1972). Appellant contends 
that her termination was improper because 
it infringed on the right of academic free-
dom. Appellant states: 
"There was nothing in the evaluative 
process or the contacts of the administra-
tors to show the plaintiff that she was 
not meeting the standards of academic 
content or methodology apparently se-
lected by the administrators." 
Academic freedom concerns protected 
rights. There was no evidence that appel-
lant was terminated for any protected ac-
tivity; she was terminated because she 
could not handle the discipline and morale 
problems of the sport teams While a non-
tenured teacher may not be terminated 
from employment for exercising a constitu-
tional right of free speech, that person has 
the burden of proving that the speech or 
conduct was constitutionally protected. 
Schmidt v. Fremont County School Dis-
trict No. 25, supra; Buhr v. Buffalo Pub-
lic School District No. 38, 509 F.2d 1196 
(8th Cir.1974). 
Academic freedom involves: 
" * * * [T]he substantive right of a 
teacher to choose a teaching method 
which in the court's view served a dem-
onstrated educational purpose, and the 
procedural right of a teacher not to be 
discharged for the use of & teaching 
method which was not proscribed by a 
regulation, and as to which it was not 
proven that he should have had notice 
that its use was prohibited." Maillotuc 
v. Kiley, 323 F Supp 1387, 1390 (D Ma*s 
1971). 
Appellant misunderstands the applicable 
law. Academic freedom does not give out 
the right to have discipline problems nor u 
be protected from termination merely be-
cause appellant was not aware that the 
administrators were dissatisfied with the 
direction of the coaching program. Aca-
demic freedom concerns constitutionally 
protected rights. Appellant has not met 
the burden of proving that her termination 
was caused by impermissible reasons nor 
that constitutionally protected rights wern 
involved. 
For the reasons stated in this opinion 
the judgment appealed from upholding ap-
pellant's termination is affirmed. 
xtv MUMKR vnnn. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the state of South Dakota, there are 178 public school districts 
t J.D., University of South Dakota, 1993; editor-in-chief, 38 S.D. L. REV. (1992-1993); law 
clerk to Honorable George W. Wuest, S.D. S. O. (1993-94). 
1994] NONRENEWAL OF TEACHER CONTRACTS 261 
"substantial evidence" and "clearly erroneous" standards.197 First, the 
court must determine whether there is "substantial evidence to support the 
school board's decision. Substantial evidence means such relevant and 
competent evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to sup-
port a conclusion."198 Next, the court determines whether the school board 
decision was clearly erroneous by examining the evidence supporting the 
school board's decision.199 Applying a clearly erroneous standard requires 
that the court determine "not whether we would have made the same deci-
sion as the school board, but whether, after reviewing the entire record, we 
are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been com-
mitted."200 Under the clearly erroneous standard, the supreme court is not 
bound by any presumption that the circuit court's decision was correct.201 
1. Application of the First Prong—Procedural Legality 
a. Board Compliance With Adopted Rules 
The supreme court has stated that policies, rules, and regulations duly 
adopted by a school board have the "force of law"202 and " 'are as binding 
as if they were statutes enacted by the Legislature.' "203 Quite simply, the 
court has held that "a school board must comply with its own rules."204 
/. Teacher Evaluation Policies 
There are two major areas that spawn the question oi whether a board 
has complied with its own policies. One of these areas involves teacher 
evaluations as related to nonrenewal of a teacher's contract.205 In Dale v. 
Board of Education,206 a tenured teacher claimed that the school board 
failed to adequately comply with its own evaluation policy prior to its deci-
sion to not renew his contract.207 The board-adopted policy was that teach-
ers should be evaluated every third year for the purpose of u improvement 
of the quality of instruction.' "208 The teacher had last been evaluated in 
197. Riter, 504 N.W.2d at 576. 
198. Id. (quoting Oldham-Ramona Sch. Dist. v. Ust, 502 N.W.2d 574, 581 (S.D. 1993) (cita-
tions omitted)). 
199. Id. 
200. Strain, 447 N.W.2d at 338 (citing Tschetter, 302 N.W.2d at 47; In re South Lincoln Rural 
Water Sys., 295 N.W.2d 743, 745 (S.D. 1980)). 
201. Id. See also Tschetter, 302 N.W.2d at 46; Moran, 281 N.W.2d at 600. Under this prong, 
the reviewing court must review the evidence to determine whether the board's decision was 
clearly erroneous. For discussion of challenges relating to sufficiency of evidence, see infra notes 
244-77 and accompanying text 
202. Nordhagen, 474 N.W.2d at 512 (citing Dale, 316 N.W.2d at 113; Schnabel, 295 N.W.2d at 
341; Schaub, 339 N.W.2d at 310). 
203. SchnabeU 295 N.W.2d at 341 (quoting Douglas County Welfare Admin, v. Parks, 284 
N.W.2d 10,11 (Neb. 1979)). 
204. Nordhagen, 474 N.W.2d at 512. See also Suiera, 351 N.W.2d at 458; Ward, 319 N.W.2d at 
504. 
205. As stated previously, school boards must adopt a teacher evaluation policy. S.D.C.L. 
§ 13-43-26. For text of the statute, see supra note 22. 
206. 316 N.W.2d 108 (S.D. 1982). 
207. Id. at 113. 
208. Id. 
262 SOUTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39 
May 1977, and was terminated in April 1980; his next formal evaluation 
was not due until May 1980.209 Since his next formal evaluation was not 
due untilvafter the date the board made its nonrenewal decision, the court 
agreed that it was not necessary to complete the review.210 The teacher 
further argued that he should have been evaluated anyway, apparently as-
serting that he was without knowledge of his teaching problems.211 The 
court disagreed, finding sufficient evidence in the record that the teacher 
was "fully cognizant" of his own deficiencies.212 
In Schaub, a nontenured, nonrenewed teacher sought reinstatement to 
her position based on allegations that the school board did not follow its 
own rules in regard to teacher evaluations.213 The court stated that it was 
unclear whether the board had violated any of its own evaluation policies, 
but that it was clear from the record that Schaub knew "that the Board was 
concerned with certain deficiencies in her teaching."214 In any event, the 
court reiterated a test with regard to reinstatement under these 
circumstances: 
[A] violation by the Board of a rule does not in and of itself justify 
reinstatement of the teacher. The test in determining whether rein-
statement is the proper remedy for a violation of teacher evaluation 
statutes is "whether a grievant has shown that the violation substan-
tially and directly impaired his or her ability to improve himself or 
herself and attain continuing contract status."215 
The court held that since Schaub had prior knowledge of her deficiencies, 
and had ample opportunity to correct them before her termination notice, 
any violation by the school board of teacher evaluation policies did not 
"substantially or directly impair" the teachers ability to improve herself.216 
A recent case, Nordhagen, also addresses compliance with a teacher 
evaluation policy.217 The board had adopted a policy stating, in pertinent 
part, that "[a] recommendation against continued employment may not be 
given without two formal evaluations and a written plan of assistance/9219 
Nordhagen argued that the plan of assistance must be a separate, written 
document; while the board's position was that the written plan could be 
contained within the two formal evaluations.219 The court found that it was 
"clear from the record that the superintendent stood ready at all times to 
209. Id. 
210. Id. 
211. Id. at 113-14. 
212. Id. The court noted that the teacher had met "numerous times'* with the board, as well 
as with administrators, concerning his teaching methods. Id. at 114. 
213. Schaub, 339 N.W.2d at 309-10. 
214. Id. at 310. 
215. Id. (quoting Fries, 307 N.W.2d at 879). 
216. Id. 
217. Nordhagen, 474 N.W.2d at 512-13. 
218. Id. at 512. 
219. Id. Within the first written evaluation was a statement indicating that Nordhagen (a prin-
cipal) and the evaluator (a superintendent) "must have a conference within 30 days after the 
recommendation to develop a written pian to implement the actions stated in the recommenda-
tion." Id. at 513. 
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meet" and develop a separate, written plan; however, the terminated em-
ployee had "refused to cooperate in developing this formal plan of assist-
ance."220 The court affirmed the school board's nonrenewal decision, 
making special note that "Nordhagen frustrated Board's written policy by 
his failure to cooperate."221 
ii. Staff Reduction Policies 
School districts generally adopt policies regarding staff reductions and 
how terminations or changes in teaching assignments will be conducted, 
should that become necessary in a district. In Schnabel v. Alcester School 
District No. 61-I,222 a tenured teacher was terminated as part of a staff 
reduction.223 The teacher appealed to the circuit court, which found that 
the board had abused its discretion and violated its own staff reduction 
policy.224 As with most staff reduction policies, the policy in question set 
out a series of priorities as to what teachers should be released first.225 An 
exception was allowed u 'where an individual staff member is needed to 
maintain an existing program/ M226 Schnabel, a tenured math teacher, was 
terminated, while the district retained an nontenured English major uwho 
was otherwise qualified to teach math."227 The board maintained that this 
decision was allowed under the "existing program" exception.228 Agreeing 
that the evidence showed otherwise, the supreme court affirmed the circuit 
court's decision that the school board had abused its discretion by violating 
its own policy.229 
Reduction of a tenured teacher's full-time position to half-time also 
comes within the protection of the continuing contract law. In Ward v. 
Viborg School District No. 60-5,230 the teacher alleged that the school board 
violated its own staff reduction policy when her position was reduced to 
half-time.231 Although the board contended that it need not afford any 
procedural due process to the teacher, the court noted that the board's own 
policy "clearly accepts the responsibility of adhering to SDCL13-43-10 and 
SDCL 13-43-10.1 whenever a tenured teacher's contract is affected by staff 
reduction."232 It was undisputed that the board failed to comply with the 
due process dictates of those statutes.233 Thus, the supreme court affirmed 
220. Id. 
221. Id. 
222. 295 N.W.2d 340 (S.D. 1980). 
223. Id. 
224. Id. at 340-41. 
225. Id. at 341. 
226. Id. 
227. Id. at 342. 
228. Id. 
229. Id. See Sutera, 351 N.W.2d at 459 (holding that the school board was compelled by its 
own staff reduction regulations to renew the contract of a tenured teacher with 13 years' experi-
ence rather than retain a nontenured teacher). 
230. 319 N.W.2d 502 (S.D. 1982). 
231. Id. at 503. 
231 Id. at 504. 
233. Id. 
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Smithfield, Utah 84335-2720 
Dear Ms. Broadbent: 
The U.S. Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights (OCR), 
has completed its investigation of the complaint you filed against 
the Cache County School District (District), a recipient of Federal 
financial assistance from the Department, The investigation was 
conducted pursuant to Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 
(Section 504) , 29 U.S.C. § 794 and its implementing regulation at 
34 C.F.R. 5 104,61, as it incorporates 34 C.F.R. S 100.7(e) and 
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (Title II) , 
42 U.S.C. S 12134 and its implementing regulation at 28 C.F.R. § 
35.140(a) and (b)(2), as it incorporates 29 C.F.R. S 1630.12(a), 
You alleged that the District retaliated against you by refusing to 
renew your employment contract. Specifically, you alleged that the 
District took this action after you participated in an evaluation 
team decision to classify a student as eligible for special 
education services, contrary to the expressed wishes of District 
officials. 
During its investigation, OCR examined District policies and 
procedures, other pertinent documents and interviewed you, District 
administrators, faculty and other staff. Based on our findings, we 
have determined that the District did not retaliate against you and 
is in compliance with Section 504 and Title II. The bases for our 
conclusions are summarized below. 
m » * 
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Background: 
You were employed as a provisional special education teacher with 
the District for three years, from 1989-92. From approximately 
October 1991 to February 1992, you acted as the case coordinator 
for a student, (JB) , who was referred for a special education 
evaluation. During that time a series of staffing meetings were 
held at which the team discussed JB. The District Director for 
Special Education Services (Director) and the Psychologist stated 
that in their opinion, psycho-educational testing showed that JB 
was not* eligible for special education services. 
At an IEP meeting on February 25, 1992, attended by several members 
of the team, youself, and JB's parent, a decision was made to place 
JB into special education and an IEP was signed. The Psychologist 
and the Director stated they did not attend because they were not 
notified of this meeting. You and another special education 
teacher, the Head of the Department at the school, stated that one 
week after the IEP was signed, you were called into the Principal's 
office and the Director angrily informed you that you should have 
followed her recommendation. Both the Director and the Principal 
recall discussing the placement decision with you and the teacher 
on that date but deny that any threatening or angry statements were 
made. 
You stated that on March 31, 1992, you were notified that your 
contract would not be renewed and you would not be offered a 
tenured teaching position* You alleged that the District did not 
renew your contract in retaliation for the placement decision. 
You filed an internal grievance which was denied upon appeal* 
During the investigation, District administrators stated that you 
were not offered a tenured teaching position because of you 
"philosophy and attitude" of special education and because of your 
"disruptive" style in advocating for placement of students into 
special education. 
Tr»g«l standard: 
The regulations implementing Section 504 at 34 C.F.R. § 104.61 as 
it incorporates 34 C.F.R. S 100.7(e), and Title II at 28 C.F.R* § 
35.140 as it incorporates 29 C.F«R. S 1630.12(a), provide that no 
recipient or other person shall intimidate, threaten, coerce, or 
discriminate against any individual for the purpose of interfering 
with any right or privilege secured by Section 504 or Title II, or 
because she or he has made a complaint, testified, assisted, or 
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding or 
hearing under these regulations. Activities protected by this 
section include asserting a right for disabled students. 
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In the investigation of a retaliation allegation, OCR considers 
whether the complainant participated in a protected activity, 
whether the District was aware of the protected activity, whether 
the complainant suffered adverse action(s) , and whether there is a 
causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse 
action of the recipient. If these elements are established OCR 
then considers whether the recipient has a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions and whether such reason is 
a pretext for discrimination. 
Protected Activity: 
You acted as case coordinator for the evaluation of JB for special 
education services. The Director and Principal indicated that you 
advocated placing students in special education more often than 
they believed was appropriate. On February 25, 1992, you and other 
District staff agreed to place JB in special education despite the 
Director's and Psychiatrist's recommendation that JB not be 
serviced in special education. The special education department 
learned of the placement decision the following day. 
OCR thus found that you raised issues of appropriate placement for 
students whom you believed to be in need of special education 
services at an IEP meeting and at other times. The placement of 
handicapped students is a District effort. Your disagreement with 
the District's efforts concerning appropriate placement constitutes 
a protected activity within the meaning of Section 504 and the ADA. 
Adverse Action: 
OCR obtained copies of District policies governing provisional 
employees (such as you) and the Utah Educator Evaluator Law which 
covers both provisional and tenured teachers. The District's 
policies state that provisional teachers are those with less than 
three years of successful teaching experience and are hired without 
the right of expectation of continued employment. These policies 
also provide that when a District intends to renew a provisional 
teacher's contract, notification will be made, where possible, at 
least two months before the end of the school year. 
District policies are silent with regard to notification of 
nonrenewal of provisional teachers' contracts• Utah state law only 
requires 60 days advance notice for nonrenewal of tenured teachers' 
contracts. The Principal and the Director stated that their 
practice is to comply with that requirement even for nontenured 
teachers and notification of nonrenewal is given by April 1 or 60 
days before the end of the school year. 
The District notified you of its decision not to renew your 
contract on March 30, 1992. OCR thus found that you were given 
adequate notice of the nonrenewal of your contract. 
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OCR considered the evidence of adverse or differential treatment in 
connection with the nonrenewal of your contract. OCR reviewed the 
evaluations received by you during the three years you were 
employed by the District. You received good evaluations from the 
Principal, Assistant Principal and the Director. You received only 
one below standard rating from the Principal in March 1991. Your 
provisional contract was renewed for the first two years, but after 
the third^ year, only three and a half weeks after your 
participation in a team decision to qualify JB for special 
education, your contract was not renewed. 
OCR found that eight other provisional teachers' contracts had not 
been renewed by the District since 1989. Two of these were special 
education teachers. One special education teacher chose to 
transfer to regular education. The second special education 
teacher received good evaluations in the first year, but mixed 
evaluations in her second year. However, the information in the 
files failed to document what personnel actions were taken in 
connection with problems in performance or evaluation. OCR thus 
found inconclusive evidence of differential treatment. 
OCR nevertheless found that you received good evaluations by the 
District and your contract had previously been renewed without 
dispute. OCR thus found that the subsequent nonrenewal of the your 
contract qualifies as an adverse action under the regulations. 
Proximate Cause: 
OCR then sought to determine whether there is a causal connection 
between the protected activity and adverse action. A causal 
connection between the protected activity and the allegedly 
retaliatory adverse action is indicative of retaliatory intent and 
can be inferred from one or more of the following: 
Proximity in time between the District's 
learning of the protected activity and the 
initiation of the adverse action; 
A change in the District's treatment of you after 
learning of the protected activity; 
Deviation by the District from its established practices; 
or 
Disparate treatment of you when compared with similarly 
situated individuals. 
As indicated above, OCR found that your actions on February 25, 
1992, were a protected activity. The District learned of those 
actions the next day. On March 30 , 1992, only one month after the 
disagreement regarding JB's placement, the District notified you of 
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the adverse action, the nonrenewal of your contract. Thus, the 
adverse act shortly followed the protected activity. The 
nonrenewal of your contract also marked a change in treatment, 
because you had previously received good evaluations and contract 
renewals. 
Because OCR found a proximity in time between the protected 
activity and adverse action and a change in treatment after the 
adverse action, OCR finds a causal connection between these acts. 
Legitimate. Nondiscriminatory Reasons(s) : 
Having established a prima facie case of retaliation, OCR then 
considered whether the District can offer legitimate, nondiscrimi-
natory reasons for its actions, and whether reasons offered are a 
pretext for retaliation. 
Philosophy and Attitude 
The Principal and the Director of Special Education stated that 
they made the decision not to offer you a tenured teaching position 
because of your educational "philosophy and attitude." The 
Director also stated that she did not believe there was any way to 
remediate your "attitude and philosophy." Both indicated that you 
advocated for the placement of more students into Special Education 
classes than they believed was necessary or appropriate. The 
Assistant Principal indicated that you had philosophical problems 
with the District and the Special Education staff's placement 
recommendations. They also indicated that your style of 
questioning and challenging special education placement decisions 
was at times disruptive. 
As examples of disruptive behavior the Principal and Director 
stated you often required scheduling changes of IEP meetings, and 
challenged the Psychologist's testing results as part of your 
advocacy. They also stated that you invited all of the student's 
teachers to participate in IEP meetings as a means of intimidating 
the psychologist into classifying a student in need of special 
education. 
OCR interviewed the other two special education teachers at your 
school and the Special Education Teacher's Aide, four regular 
education teachers, the Assistant Principal, the Psychologist, the 
Speech Therapist, and a school Counselor who variously described 
you as a good to exceptional teacher. When asked specifically 
about your philosophy, special education staff stated you acted out 
of concern for students. 
The Principal stated that he spoke to you five or six times during 
your provisional period at the request of the Director, about 
problems he perceived with your attitude. You denied having 
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conversations with the Principal regarding dissatisfaction with 
your teaching. The Principal indicated that you did not make any 
changes in your behavior. The Principal further stated that he did 
not keep a written record of these meetings because you were a 
provisional teacher and he thought he was only required to document 
such information for tenured teachers. 
The Director stated she only discussed her dissatisfaction with you 
with the Principal because she considered the Principal to be her 
supervisor. The Head of the Special Education department confirmed 
that she was not informed of any problems with your performance . 
The Principal, Assistant Principal and the Director gave you 
letters of recommendation in April of 1992, with positive remarks. 
The Principal stated during his OCR interview that he thought you 
had trouble getting along with other teachers, despite his positive 
recommendations. 
While OCR found that staff members considered that you acted out of 
concern for students, your methods and special education philosophy 
and attitude were considered disruptive or inappropriate by staff 
members including the Principal, the Director of Special Education, 
and the Assistant Principal. District staff explained that they 
did not document problems in your performance because you were 
hired without the right or expectation of continued employment. 
OCR found that an inconsistency between the District's and your 
approach or philosophy of special education is a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory basis for the nonrenewal of your contract. 
Scheduling 
The Principal and the Director stated that you were, at times, 
disruptive and required "scheduling changes" for meetings that were 
inconvenient for staff. They presented no specific examples of 
incidents in which you were responsible for disrupting school staff 
by requiring scheduling changes. However, the Principal met with 
special education staff during school year 1991-92, and asked them 
to make scheduling requests through his off ice, rather than through 
you. 
Special education staff remembered the Principal's directive but 
did not think that he gave the name of the individuals causing 
scheduling problems. The staff reported that meetings were 
thereafter scheduled by a special education aide. The aide noted 
that the Principal indicated he did not want you to schedule 
meetings directly so he could keep track of what you and other 
special education teachers were doing* Meetings were at times 
rescheduled by the aide to accommodate special education staff, the 
Psychologist and parents. 
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The Psychologist stated that she was not informed of the February 
25, 1992 IEP meeting concerning JB. The aide and you stated that 
you had left a messages for the Psychologist at her office since 
she had attended previous meetings. The Psychologist stated that 
she never received such a message. The Director also stated that 
he was unaware of the meeting. Although it appears that scheduling 
procedures were not followed regarding JB's IEP meeting, OCR could 
not determine whether you interfered with this process. 
OCR nevertheless found that the Principal expressed problems in 
entrusting special education scheduling to you and specifically 
requested that you be removed from this task. The legitimate and 
nondiscriminatory reason presented by the District was thus 
substantiated by our investigation. 
TEP Results and Meetings 
The Principal and the Director stated that you challenged the 
Psychologist's decisions when evaluating students for special 
education• The Psychologist confirmed that you often disagreed 
with her conclusions. 
You stated that you were "surprised" by some decisions made with 
regard to the placement of special education students and you 
"inquired" about decisions, You denied that you ever argued or 
confronted the Director or the Psychologist over these decisions„ 
Other special education staff acknowledged that you disagreed with 
some District staff, including the Director and Psychologist, but 
did not think you invited teachers to IEP meetings specifically for 
the purpose of pressuring the Psychologist. 
OCR found that you challenged the findings and recommendations of 
the Psychologist and Director at IEP meetings* While some staff 
members expressed no problem with the practice, administrative 
staff disputed the appropriateness of this practice. OCR finds 
that the District presented a legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis 
for the nonrenewal of your contract based on perceived difficulties 
in accepting other staff members recommendations when you did not 
agree with those recommendations, 
JB's Special Education Placement 
The Principal, the Assistant Principal and the Director stated that 
the nonrenewal of your contract was not specifically attributed to 
the qualification of JB for special education. However, the 
District indicated that you did not follow appropriate procedures 
regarding JB's placement and qualification into special education. 
District staff were in disagreement over JB's placement. The 
Psychologist and the Director stated that JB did not qualify for 
special education based on his test results, and that JB's problems 
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could be addressed through means other than special education* 
Other team members indicated that special education services were 
necessary to address JB's academic and social problems and that 
they wanted an opportunity to refute the testing results. 
on February 17, 1992, several IEP staff members of the team 
expressed concern for J3 in a letter to the Director, The Director 
responded by means of a memorandum dated February 25, 1992. The 
memorandum was addressed to each IEP team member and indicated that 
JB did not qualify for special education services, though the team 
could "override" test results with adequate data. An IEP meeting 
was held later that day, which placed JB in special education 
despite the Director's recommendation* The IEP was signed by all 
members present except for one of the two other attending special 
education teachers. The IEP meeting was held without the Director 
or Psychologist, who insisted that they were not notified of the 
meeting. You asserted that you were not aware that any procedures 
had been violated and believed to be acting in the best interests 
of the student. 
The Director and the Psychologist stated that District policy 
required the presence of a psychologist at JB's IEP meeting. The 
Psychologist explained that State guidelines require the presence 
of a counselor, mental health worker or psychologist at IEP 
meetings. Based on those guidelines, the District requires that a 
psychologist be present at every initial placement, behavior 
disorder or self-containment determination. JB was identified as 
having a behavior disorder and placed in self-contained special 
education classes without her presence. 
The Director stated that the requirement that a psychologist be 
present became effective in the District in 1990. You stated that 
you were unaware of this requirement. The Director indicated that 
teachers were informed of this change in policy during their 
training. Special education staff stated that they were aware that 
the Psychologist participated in many meetings, but her presence 
was not mandatory at every meeting. 
In addition, the Psychologist and the Director stated that District 
policy requires a classification of behavior disorder (condition 
identified for JB) to be supported by three behavior observations• 
The observations were done to comply with this requirement only 
after the IEP was signed. You and other special education staff 
stated that they were unfamiliar with these requirements. 
OCR found that you were the case coordinator for an IEP meeting 
which placed JB in special education without adherence to District 
procedural requirements. The failure to adhere to procedure is 
significant since only the Director or Psychologist were aware of 
all necessary requirements for making that placement decision. 
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This failure presents a legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for the 
District's decision not to renew your contract* 
The District thus presented legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons 
for the nonrenewal of your contract- OCR found insufficient 
evidence to determine that the reasons presented were pretextual. 
Conclusion: 
Based on all the evidence reviewed, OCR has concluded that there is 
insufficient evidence to demonstrate that you were subjected to 
retaliation by the District. Accordingly, the District is in 
compliance with Section 504 and Title II of the ADA. 
OCR is closing this complaint investigation as of the date of this 
letter. This letter addresses only the issues discussed and should 
not be interpreted as a determination of the District's compliance 
or noncompliance with Section 504 or Title II in any other respect• 
Individuals filing a complaint or participating in an investigation 
are protected by Federal law against harassment, retaliation/ or 
intimidation by 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(e). 
The findings presented in this Letter of Findings have undergone a 
multi-level review for legal sufficiency and adherence to OCR 
policy. The manner in which we determined compliance and the facts 
to support that determination are set forth in the letter. If , 
after review of this letter, you believe that you have evidence 
that refutes the facts presented and that such evidence would alter 
the findings, you may request reconsideration of this 
determination. Requests for reconsideration must be submitted to 
this Office postmarked within 30 days of the date of this letter* 
Please note that a request for reconsideration must: 
1„ specify which findings were based on incorrect information; 
2. specify which relevant facts were not included in the 
findings; and 
3. provide any evidence that will support the above. 
A request for reconsideration cannot merely express general 
disagreement with our findings* 
Under the Freedom of Information Act, it may be necessary to 
release this document and related correspondence and records upon 
request. In the event that OCR receives such a request, we will 
seek to protect, to the extent provided by law, personal 
information which, if released, could constitute an unwarranted 
invasion of privacy. 
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We wish to thank you for your assistance in the course of this 
investigation. If you have any questions regarding the findings or 
procedures addressed in this letter, you may call Mr. David Dunbar, 
Chief Regional Attorney, at (303) 844-5313. 
